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TOXIC REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC
HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE:
CHALLENGING THE MYTHS OF THE
TORT AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
JEAN MACCHIAROLI EGGEN*
In this Article Professor Eggen discusses how various scientific studies suggest a
causal connection between workers' reproductive and genetic injuries and their
exposure to toxins in the workplace Because of conflicts between scientific and
legal causation standards, workers and affected family members often cannot
prove a sufficient causal connection between toxic exposure and ensuing injury to
recover under existing workers' compensation and tort laws. Thus; Professor Eg-
gen proposes several specific reforms to both the workers' compensation and tort
law systems to improve the availability of these relief mechanisms for toxic expo-
sure victims.
INTRODUCTION
N the nineteenth century, public health analysts acknowledged the so-
cial and economic significance of reproductive health by recording
data pertaining to reproductive outcomes. Despite this initial interest,
reproductive health in the workplace has received little attention until
recent years. Extraordinarily few studies have been conducted on work-
place toxins to examine their potential reproductive and genetic effects.'
While the Occupational Safety and Health Act3 ("OSH Act") provides
some regulation of toxic substances in the workplace,4 the Act offers no
* Associate Professor, Widener University School of Law; J.D. 1982, Syracuse Uni-
versity College of Law; M.A. 1974, Michigan State University; A.B. 1971, Connecticut
College. The author wishes to thank John Culhane, Barry Furrow, and Martin Kotler
for reviewing and commenting upon drafts of this article. The author also gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Cynthia Funaro, Lisa Hunn, and David
Schlechter.
1. See Bregman, Anderson, Buffier & Saig, Surveillance for Work-Related Adverse
Reproductive Outcomes, 79 Am. J. Pub. Health 53, 54 (Supp. 1989).
2. See United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive
Health Hazards in the Workplace 3 (1985) (stating that "most commercial chemicals
have not been thoroughly evaluated for their possible toxic effects on reproduction and
development") [hereinafter Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health
Hazards]. In general, very few states keep any form of centralized records on occupa-
tional hazards to the reproductive and genetic systems of workers. Although thousands
of chemicals appear on the Toxic Substances Control Act inventory, toxicity statistics are
unavailable for the vast majority. See M. Rothstein, Medical Screening and the Em-
ployee Health Cost Crisis 48 (1989).
3. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 2, 84 Stat.
1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1985) [hereinafter OSH Act]).
4. Congress set forth the following means of achieving the goals of the OSH Act:
(1) by encouraging employers and employees in their efforts to reduce the
number of occupational safety and health hazards ... and to stimulate (them]
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avenue of relief for occupational illness generally or for genetic injury
specifically. The remedial mechanisms of workers' compensation and
tort law are similarly inadequate to address the growing number of re-
productive and genetic health problems arising from the workplace.
The insidious nature of occupational reproductive and genetic injury
lies in its causal indeterminacy. Reproductive injuries, such as infertility
and spontaneous abortion,5 can often be virtually indistinguishable from
background levels of these conditions in the general population, render-
ing medical identification and analysis nearly impossible.6 In addition,
although the worker experiences the most direct exposure to a toxic sub-
stance, third parties, such as the worker's spouse or offspring, often suffer
to institute new and to perfect existing programs for providing safe and health-
ful working conditions;
(2) by providing that employers and employees have separate but independent
responsibilities and rights with respect to achieving safe and healthful working
conditions;
(5) by providing for research in the field of occupational safety and health ...
and by developing innovative methods, techniques, and approaches for dealing
with occupational safety and health problems;
(6) by exploring ways to discover latent diseases, establishing causal connec-
tions between diseases and work in environmental conditions.... ;
(7) by providing medical criteria which will assure... that no employee will
suffer diminished health, functional capacity, or life expectancy as a result of his
work experience.
OSH Act, supra note 3, § 65 1 (b)(1)-(7). See generally Holzman, The Occupational Safety
& Health Act: Is It Time for Change?, 17 N. Ky. L. Rev. 177, 178-81 (1989) (presenting
review of legislative history and public policy underlying OSH Act). The general duty
clause of the OSH Act provides that an employer must furnish a workplace free from
"recognized hazards" that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to its employees. OSH Act, supra note 3, § 654(a). The OSH Act, however, does
not grant the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") or any other
agency the authority to compensate victims of occupational accidents or illness. See Vis-
cusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim Compensation and Risk
Regulation, 2 Yale J. on Reg. 53, 61-62 (1984). The Act expressly preserves existing
remedies for employees under state statutory and common law. Nothing in the Act
shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen's compen-
sation law or... affect in any.. . manner the common law or statutory rights,
duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to
injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of,
employment.
OSH Act, supra note 3, § 653(4). Thus, the state-law mechanisms of workers' compensa-
tion and tort law provide the sole means of remedying injuries resulting from toxic expo-
sures in the occupational setting. While this Article addresses the problems raised by
judicial efforts to apply these remedial mechanisms to toxic reproductive and genetic inju-
ries in the workplace, an analysis of the regulatory problems presented by such injuries is
beyond its scope and is more appropriately the topic of a separate article.
5. "Spontaneous abortion" is defined as "[g]iving birth to an embryo or fetus prior
to the stage of viability" in a manner "that has not been artificially induced." Stedman's
Medical Dictionary 3 (24th ed. 1982).
6. See Paul & Himmelstein, Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace: What the Prac-
titioner Needs to Know About Chemical Exposures, 71 Obstetrics & Gynecology 921, 921
(1988).
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the full force of the injury." The expressions of many chemically induced
genetic mutations8 in the hereditary line may not occur for one or more
generations. 9 Not only do these characteristics permit occupational inju-
ries to masquerade in the population as arbitrary background events, but
they also prevent victim compensation for legitimate work-related
injuries.
For several decades, the law of toxic exposures has evolved in response
to increasing public awareness of the vast array of problems generated by
the use and disposal of toxic substances. The workplace setting has given
rise to a large portion of the early toxic tort case law, most notably in the
multitude of lawsuits brought by injured asbestos insulation workers
against the asbestos industry's manufacturing giants.'0 Yet, courts have
struggled with the application of the traditional modes and presumptions
of the legal doctrines to these unconventional injuries.
Recently, the issue of reproductive toxins in the workplace moved to a
central position in the public consciousness with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls,
Inc.." The Court in this case held that an employer's fetal protection
policy, which excluded all fertile women from jobs involving exposure to
lead, violated federal law by unjustifiably discriminating against wo-
men. 2 Although the majority denied concern for any incremental ex-
pansion of employer liability that might accompany widespread
compliance with the Johnson Controls decision, 3 Justice White's concur-
7. Cf Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377, 381, 570 N.E.2d 198, 199, 568
N.Y.S.2d 550, 551 (1991) (denying cause of action for injured granddaughter of woman
who ingested drug DES while pregnant), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 197 (1991).
8. A mutation is a "change in the character of a gene that is perpetuated in subse-
quent divisions of the cell in which it occurs." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 912 (24th
ed. 1982). For further discussion of mutations, see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
9. See United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Genetic Monitor-
ing and Screening in the Workplace app. A, at 191-96 (1990) [hereinafter Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, Genetic Monitoring].
10. See, e.g., Kaijala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158 (8th Cir.
1975) (holding manufacturer liable under strict products liability theory for failure to
warn workers of asbestos dangers); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1973) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
11. United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
12. See id. at 1207. The Court noted that the bias inherent in the employee protec-
tion policy at issue in the Johnson Controls case affected women disproportionately to
men: "Fertile men, but not fertile women, are given a choice as to whether they wish to
risk their reproductive health for a particular job." Id. at 1202. The Court found this to
be constitutionally untenable, finding that the true classification represented by the policy
was not the gender-neutral concept of fertility, but the gender-specific fact of child-bear-
ing capacity. See id. at 1203.
13. See id. at 1208-09. In dicta, the Court acknowledged the collateral issue of poten-
tial employer tort liability for prenatal injuries suffered by offspring whose mothers now
may choose to work in a lead-exposed environment rather than accept a lesser paying
position. See id. at 1208-09. The Court observed that a future issue for decision in an
appropriate case would be whether compliance by an employer with relevant OSHA stan-
dards for exposure to lead in the workplace would pre-empt state common-law tort liabil-
ity for offspring injuries arising out of maternal occupational lead exposure. See id. In
1992]
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rence suggested that "the possibility of tort liability is not hypothetical,"
particularly in light of the potential harm to the offspring of exposed
workers. 14
Johnson Controls portends critical issues that will confront the legal
system well into the next century. First, the etiology of reproductive and
genetic injury and the relationship of occupational exposure to hazardous
substances currently are poorly understood." Accordingly, these inju-
ries have been subject to ambiguous treatment by the legal system. This
is particularly evident in the often preclusive operation of legal causation
standards within the contexts of both the workers' compensation system
and the tort system. Second, toxic exposures in the workplace may have
significant ramifications beyond the immediate employer-employee rela-
tionship. Actions by the affected spouses and offspring of workers will
put the system to the test. The law, in its current state of evolution, is ill-
equipped to address the myriad of complicated questions raised by this
type of injury.
The evolution of the law of toxic exposures has been tortuous, and
analysis reveals a disconcerting ambivalence toward reproductive and ge-
netic injuries. Standards that arose within the narrow confines of tradi-
tional accident law no longer suit the more complex and convoluted
medical and legal issues presented by these injuries. The time is appro-
priate to reexamine the operation of the fundamental policies of compen-
sation, accident avoidance, and loss-spreading in light of this new and
problematic class of injuries. Novel approaches and reformulations of
traditional rules are warranted to revitalize the legal system's alleged
commitment to provide reasonable victim compensation and to assign
appropriate industry accountability.
Part I of this Article surveys the state of medical knowledge regarding
reproductive and genetic injuries caused by exposure to toxic substances
in the workplace. Part II analyzes the current treatment of these injuries
under the existing dual remedial scheme of workers' compensation and
common-law tort liability, concluding that these regimes provide inade-
quate relief to legitimately injured workers and their families. Part III
examines the ways in which reproductive and genetic injuries challenge
the traditional presumptions and policies of the tort and workers' com-
pensation systems, emphasizing the need for a new jurisprudence of toxic
his concurrence, Justice White noted that "it is far from clear that compliance with Title
VII will pre-empt state tort liability," speculating that under the rule of Johnson Controls,
employers will face increased difficulty in determining appropriate workplace safety prac-
tices so as to avoid tort liability. Id. at 1211 (White, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 1210-I1 (White, J., concurring). Justice White observed that while barring
claims by injured employees who have been adequately warned of potential workplace
exposures is reasonable, preventing claims by the employees' children is far less likely
under traditional tort law: "[T]he general rule is that parents cannot waive causes of
action on behalf of their children, and the parents' negligence will not be imputed to the
children." Id. at 1211 (White, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
15. See Paul & Himmelstein, supra note 6, at 921.
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liability. Finally, Part IV proposes several judicial and legislative re-
forms including realignment of the burden of proof of causation, expan-
sion of exceptions to the exclusivity of workers' compensation,
establishment of a legislative compensation scheme for subsequent gener-
ations of persons injured as a result of an initial reproductive or genetic
occupational injury, availability of medical surveillance compensation,
and encouragement of scientific research and information dissemination
regarding reproductive and genetic hazards.
I. THE SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE OF REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC
HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE
For almost a century, studies have suggested an association between
certain chemical exposures in the workplace environment and reproduc-
tion-related injuries in both female and male workers.I6 The earliest con-
clusions connected workplace lead exposure to infertility, pregnancy loss,
and a host of injuries to offspring. 7 Notwithstanding these initial discov-
eries, the problem of reproductive hazards in the workplace was largely
ignored by researchers until the 1970s.11 During that decade, scientists
observed relationships between workplace toxins and both reproductive
and genetic injuries.' 9 In addition, public awareness of the events sur-
rounding Love Canal increased concern for the effects of exposure to all
environmental toxins and spurred further study of toxic hazards in the
workplace.2 0 Nevertheless, reproductive and genetic workplace hazards
have not yet received a level of attention commensurate with the threat
they pose.
A. The Demography of Reproductive and Genetic Injuries
in the Workplace
Studies estimate that up to fourteen million American workers may be
16. See S. Barlow & F. Sullivan, Reproductive Hazards of Industrial Chemicals 3
(1982) [hereinafter Barlow & Sullivan].
17. See id. (citing Rom, Effects of Lead on the Female and Reproduction: A Review,
43 Mt. Sinai J. Med. 542 (1976)).
18. Interest in reproductive hazards generally was piqued by Japanese studies on the
toxicity of mercury found in fish, which issued in the 1970s. See Barlow & Sullivan,
supra note 16, at 3-4. In 1976, scientific and public attention focused on an industrial
accident in Seveso, Italy, in which a toxic cloud of dioxin was released into the environ-
ment with subsequent teratogenic effects. See id. at 4. See generally T. Whiteside, The
Pendulum and the Toxic Cloud 31-62 (1979) (discussing the 1976 explosion at a chemical
factory in the Lombardy region of Italy). At approximately the same time, studies began
to appear regarding reproductive hazards to men who were exposed to pesticides or vinyl
chloride in the course of their employment. See Barlow & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 4.
19. The workplace toxins studied included various industrial chemicals, biological
agents, and ionizing radiation. See Barlow & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 4.
20. See generally Guidelines for Studies of Human Populations Exposed to Muta-
genic and Reproductive Hazards (A. Bloom ed. 1981) (this report was compiled in re-
sponse to the controversy arising from cytogenetic studies of residents of contaminated
communities).
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exposed each year to potential reproductive hazards in the workplace.2
Indeed, the Centers for Disease Control have included reproductive dis-
orders among the ten most common work-related complaints in the
United States.22 Notwithstanding preliminary concerns, comparatively
few workplace substances have been studied for their potential effect on
human reproduction or genetic make-up.23 Existing studies, however,
show that both men and women workers suffer genetic and reproductive
injuries from exposure to workplace toxins. These toxic exposure inju-
ries include infertility, various pregnancy-related injuries such as sponta-
neous abortion and stillbirth, cancer in children of exposed workers, and
various genetically-related disorders.
1. Infertility
In general, statistics indicate that involuntary infertility affects any-
where from eight and one-half percent to fifteen percent of all couples. 4
Infertility diagnoses are about evenly divided between female-based infer-
tility, male-based infertility, and infertility attributable to a combination
of female and male factors.25
With few exceptions, scientific research on reproductive workplace in-
juries has emphasized female exposure to toxins.26 Studies suggest that
toxic exposure in the workplace may cause a direct defect in the ovum,
prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum in the uterus, and interfere with
the process by which the pituitary or the ovaries direct the release of
hormones during the menstrual cycle, thus causing a variety of distur-
bances in fertility.27 Male exposure to workplace toxins may result in
diminished sperm count or motility or in an increased number of abnor-
mal or damaged sperm.2' Recent studies implicating male occupational
21. See Paul, Daniels & Rosofsky, Corporate Response to Hazards in the Workplace:
Results of the Family, Work and Health Survey, 16 Am. J. Indus. Med. 267, 267 (1989).
22. See Leading Work-Related Diseases and Injuries-United States, 34 Morbidity &
Mortality Weekly Rep. 537, 537 (Sept. 6, 1985). The National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health ("NIOSH") ranked reproductive disorders as the sixth highest work-
related disease or injury in the United States. See id. An editorial note in the CDC
report states that the preliminary observations reported demonstrate that the problem of
occupationally-induced reproductive disorders is "widespread and serious," but notes
that scientific research in the area is "in its infancy." Id. at 539.
23. See Office of Technology Assessment, Genetic Monitoring, supra note 9, at 67.
24. See Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Family, Work & Health 8 (1988); Hirsch
& Mosher, Characteristics of Infertile Women in the United States and Their Use of Infer-
tility Services, 47 Fertility & Sterility 618, 618 (1987). Typically, infertility is defined as
"the inability of a couple to conceive after 12 months of intercourse without contracep-
tion." United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Infertility: Medical
and Social Choices 35 (1988) [hereinafter Office of Technology Assessment, Infertility].
25. See Office of Technology Assessment, Infertility, supra note 24, at 36.
26. For a discussion of the historically disparate impact of workplace regulation on
females as a result of their gestational role, see Comment, Birth Defects Caused By Paren-
tal Exposure to Workplace Hazards: The Interface of Title VI1 with OSHA and Tort Law,
12 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 237, 238-48 (1979).
27. See Barlow & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 5.
28. See id. at 5-6.
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exposure in couple infertility2 9 may stimulate more systematic research
on the association between reproductive injuries and men's workplace
environment.
Impaired fertility has been associated with exposure to a variety of
workplace toxins,30 including metals such as lead and mercury, a" agricul-
tural chemicals such as dichlorodiphenyldichloroethane ("DDT"), 32 sev-
eral classes of industrial chemicals,33 and physical agents such as ionizing
radiation.3" Associations between workplace substances and decreased
fertility occasionally have been discovered by workers themselves, as in
the case of dibromochloropropane ("DBCP"), a pesticide eventually con-
firmed to be spermatotoxic.35
A natural limitation on the study of the relationship between infertility
and workplace exposures is that multiple biological processes are in-
volved in human conception. A substance may have an adverse impact
on a single isolated step in the reproductive process, such as the ability of
a fertilized egg to implant in the uterus, or it may have a more complex
effect on several stages in the process. Identification of both the specific
injury and its cause often can be difficult.36
29. See generally Occupational Exposure to Lead, Other Toxins May Be Missed Source
of Male Infertility, Reproductive Tech. Update, July 1991, at 78 (stating that several
occupational toxins are known to harm the male reproductive system including lead,
ethylene glycol ethers, and carbon disulfide).
30. This Article focuses on toxic exposures in the workplace affecting the reproduc-
tive systems of males and females and human genetic structure. The injuries discussed
can be direct-such as damage to human eggs or sperm-or indirect-such as carcino-
genesis affecting these systems. This Article does not address non-toxic workplace stim-
uli or conditions, such as physical and psychological stress.
31. See Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note
2, at 69-74.
32. See id. at 74-78.
33. Examples of industrial chemicals that have been associated with disruption of
fertility are polybrominated biphenyls ("PBBs"), polychlorinated biphenyls ('PCBs"),
organic solvents, formaldehyde, and chloroprene, which is used in the production of rub-
ber. See id. at 78-91.
34. See id. at 94-96. Ionizing radiation may be defined as "energy that is transmitted
in wave or particle form and is capable of causing ionization (ejecting orbital electrons) of
atoms or molecules in the irradiated tissue." Id. at 94. Ionizing radiation is distinguish-
able from nonionizing radiation which is produced by ultraviolet and infrared light, la-
sers, electromagnetic fields such as shortwave radio and microwave sources and some
appliances, and video display terminals ("VDTs"). See id. at 96-102.
35. See Whorton, Environmental and Occupational Reproductive Hazards, in Men's
Reproductive Health 193-95 (J. Swanson & K. Forrest eds. 1984). In seven follow-up
studies performed in the 1970s on males exposed to DBCP in the workplace, results
demonstrated that 14.5% of the men were azoospermic, while 21% were oligospermic.
See id. at 194. The DBCP case studies represented a turning point that lent credence to
the role of workplace exposures in male infertility and encouraged speculation into the
role of male reproductive injuries in adverse pregnancy outcomes. See id. at 195.
36. See generally Baird & Wilcox, Effects of Occupational Exposures on the Fertility of
Couples, 1 Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews 361, 362-63 (1986) (discuss-
ing reasons for studying the fertility of couples as basis for determining toxic reproductive
injuries).
1992]
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2. Pregnancy-Related Injuries
Toxic exposures to a developing fetus can occur when a pregnant wo-
man is exposed to a harmful substance in the course of employment.
Damage can result not only in spontaneous abortion, stillbirth, or infant
death, but also in physical, mental, or behavioral abnormalities in off-
spring. Furthermore, such toxic exposures can account for cancer devel-
oped by the offspring.37 Typically, structural teratogens3 8 do their
greatest damage after implantation of the embryo in the uterus and
through the embryonic period.39 Functional teratogens may cause ad-
verse effects throughout the embryonic and fetal periods.'W The nature
and extent of injury to the embryo, fetus, or offspring will depend on the
timing and degree of the exposure as well as on the characteristics of the
toxic substance.41
Workplace toxins affecting pregnancy outcome and offspring health
often are the same substances that affect fertility. These substances range
from chemicals and metals to physical agents such as ionizing radia-
tion.42 Moreover, certain maternal changes during the course of preg-
nancy may render both the mother and the developing fetus more
susceptible to toxic exposures in the workplace. For example, normal
changes in digestion and blood transport during pregnancy could en-
hance the detrimental effect of exposure to some toxins through ingestion
or inhalation.43
Paternal exposures also can affect a developing fetus. For example,
clothing contaminated by workplace toxins could expose a pregnant wo-
man and the fetus she carries to the hazardous substances if that clothing
is introduced into the home, similarly increasing the risk of spontaneous
abortion, stillbirth, and adverse outcomes in the offspring.4'
3. Carcinogenicity
Transplacental carcinogens 45 can trigger a carcinogenic process in the
37. See Barlow & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 6.
38. In general, a teratogen is "a drug or other agent that causes abnormal develop-
ment" in a fetus. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1418 (24th ed. 1982).
39. See Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note
2, at 56. The embryonic period lasts from approximately the third through the eighth or
ninth week of pregnancy. See id. at 49.
40. See id. at 56. The fetal period begins at approximately the eighth or ninth week of
pregnancy and continues until birth. See id. at 49.
41. See Barlow & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 6-7; Office of Technology Assessment,
Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note 2, at 57.
42. See Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note
2, at 69-96.
43. See Paul & Himmelstein, supra note 6, at 926.
44. See id. The authors also note that some pharmacological agents can be present in
the seminal fluid, thus creating a risk of injury to an exposed fetus. See id.
45. "[T]ransplacental carcinogens" are "[c]hemicals that induce cancer with gesta-
tional exposure." Barlow & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 7. The discussion in this Article
of workplace carcinogens will be limited to gestational exposures of the embryo or fetus
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fetus resulting in the infant being born with a tumor.' In some cases,
older children of exposed workers develop cancer4" which can be traced
to their exposure to toxins in utero. For example, gestational exposure to
ionizing radiation has been associated with childhood cancer.48
4. Genetic Hazards
Genetic mutations caused by exposure to workplace toxins have been
associated with injuries such as pregnancy loss and infertility in the
worker, as well as with cancer and other disease in offspring.49 Exposure
to a genotoxic substance may cause genetic damage to both the reproduc-
tive cells and non-reproductive system cels.50 With respect to the for-
mer, a workplace toxin may cause chromosomal abnormalities during
the development of the egg or sperm, preventing fertilization;5 in cases
in which fertilization does occur, the embryos often spontaneously
abort.52 As to the latter, exposure of a developing embryo or fetus to a
and their effect on resulting offspring. Accordingly, this Article will not address the ef-
fects of workplace exposures to carcinogenic substances on men and women of childbear-
ing age.
46. See id.
47. See Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note
2, at 96.
48. See M. Whorton, Reproductive Disorders, in Occupational Health: Recognizing
and Preventing Work-Related Disease 307, 309 (B. Levy & D. Wegman 1st ed. 1983).
49. Genetic mutations have been succinctly described as
microlesions in DNA involving the addition, deletion, or substitution of one or
more nucleotides in the DNA sequence. Mutations can be inherited through
the male or female germ cell or can occur in somatic cells during embryogene-
sis. Genotoxic damage to the germ cell, if unrepaired, can lead to sterility or
can be passed on to offspring, resulting in embryolethality.... Mutagenic in-
sult to somatic cells may be associated with carcinogenesis.
Paul & Himmelstein, supra note 6, at 924.
50. See D. Brusick, Principles of Genetic Toxicology 45 (1980). Research on the
genetic effects of toxic substances on non-reproductive system cells, known as somatic
cells, has focused on carcinogenesis. See id. at 45-47. Because mutations of the somatic
cells have been associated with the development and growth of tumors in the immediately
exposed individual, scientists have concentrated on genotoxicity within this context. See
id.; Office of Technology Assessment, Genetic Monitoring, supra note 9, at 55. This Arti-
cle addresses somatic mutations only insofar as they occurred as the result of exposure of
a developing embryo or fetus to the occupational genotoxin. This Article also encom-
passes the issue of mutations in the reproductive system cells and their broader implica-
tions. For example, mutations could impact not only the immediately exposed
individual, but also the descendants of that person for generations to come. See D.
Brusick, supra, at 45-46.
51. Because the female's complete supply of eggs exists at the time of her birth, muta-
genic exposures in adulthood may not affect the eggs. A mutagenic exposure to a female
fetus in utero, however, could affect her eggs when she develops into adulthood. See
Barlow & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 7. In contrast, males produce sperm continuously
during adulthood and thus are more susceptible to mutagenic damage. See id. Studies
have shown that over 90% of fetuses with chromosomal abnormalities are spontaneously
aborted, see Paul & Himmelstein, supra note 6, at 924, and that over 50% of spontane-
ously aborted fetuses show evidence of chromosomal abnormalities, see Barlow & Sulli-
van, supra note 16, at 6.
52. See Barlow & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 6.
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genotoxic substance could result in teratogenesis 53 or other abnormalities
within that developing entity.5
4
Some genetic abnormalities are recessive." Thus, an occupational ex-
posure of either the sperm or egg to a genotoxic substance could result in
an alteration that is transmitted to subsequent generations.
Only sparse research has been conducted on the relationship between
genetic abnormalities and workplace chemicals or other toxins. The pos-
sibility that the mutagenic effects of a substance may not be expressed for
one or more generations has hindered research efforts by complicating
data collection. 6 Moreover, prediction of mutagenic effects resulting
from exposures in the occupational setting is complicated by the diffi-
culty scientists experience in distinguishing natural, spontaneous muta-
tions from environmentally induced mutations in certain instances.
5 7
B. Epidemiological and Toxicological Considerations
The full ramifications of toxins in the workplace are not yet known.
Potentially, they can affect reproduction in both the genetic and develop-
mental stages, from maturation of the egg or sperm to health of the fetus,
child, or even subsequent generations.58 One substance might cause dif-
ferent types of injuries, whereas several different substances may cause
identical harms.59 A substance's effect might manifest itself immediately
or may require cumulative exposures to become apparent. In addition,
some injuries may be the result of the interaction between more than one
workplace toxin and the system of the worker.'
In the traditional personal injury claim, clinical test results are the pri-
53. Teratogenesis may be defined as "the origin or mode of production of a mal-
formed fetus; the disturbed growth processes involved in the production of a malformed
fetus." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1418 (24th ed. 1982).
54. See D. Brusick, supra note 50, at 50-51.
55. Recessive mutations may be defined as "those events which are not expressed
unless the affected individual receives mutant genes from both parents." Id. at 54. Be-
cause several generations may pass for the incidence of a particular mutation to increase
in the human population, the expression of the mutation may not appear until such late
date. See id. at 55; see also Barlow and Sullivan, supra note 16, at 6. For a discussion of
recessive mutations, see D. Brusick, supra note 50, at 54-56.
56. In the words of one genetic toxicologist, "[c]oncern over genotoxicity must be
developed through an awareness of the serious consequences likely to occur 100 years or
more from today if human exposure to significant levels of mutagenic agents is not pre-
vented." D. Brusick, supra note 50, at 46.
57. See id. at 109.
58. See supra notes 21-57 and accompanying text.
59. For example, exposure to the organic solvent styrene has been linked to spontane-
ous abortion as well as congenital hydrocephalus and hepatic angiosarcomas. See Office
of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note 2, at 130. Both
DBCP and lead have been linked to low or subnormal sperm counts in men exposed to
the substances. See id. at 69, 75.
60. See Whorton, supra note 48, at 312. "Theoretically, a single agent could cause
several different outcomes: infertility, mutation, and teratogenic effect. For example, a
congenital malformation, low birth weight, or a childhood behavior problem may all re-
sult from teratogens or toxins that slow the growth of crucial cell groups." Id.
[Vol. 60
TOXIC HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE
mary means of determining both the cause of the claimant's injury and
the extent of damage. With reproductive and genetic injuries, however,
scientific uncertainty regarding toxicity and mutagenicity-along with
insufficient insight into the disease processes-render clinical studies in-
adequate. This may be true even where clinical studies demonstrate the
presence of a known or suspected hazardous substance in the claimant's
body. Studies of sperm count and morphology, for example, have re-
vealed strong associations between occupational exposure to certain sub-
stances and abnormal profiles. Even such results, however, may be
inconclusive in light of the many possible confounding factors.
Accordingly, epidemiological and toxicological studies have become
the principal scientific methods of more precisely ascertaining the rela-
tionship between the occupational setting and reproductive and genetic
injuries. While these studies are pervasively used, they are imperfect for
a variety of reasons.
1. Epidemiological Studies
Epidemiology is a statistical methodology that employs surveys and
sampling to reveal probabilities of relationships between exposures and
clusters of disease or other conditions.62 Because direct human experi-
mentation with workplace toxins is not acceptable on ethical grounds,
epidemiology is the method of choice for studying human populations.
By studying groups of humans, epidemiologists draw inferences regard-
ing the causes of individual occurrences about which clinical data alone
may be insufficient.63 By its very nature, however, epidemiology is im-
perfect, as it can only express probabilities and cannot identify actual
causes." The principal value of epidemiological studies is in determining
61. See Office of Technology Assessment, Genetic Monitoring, supra note 9, at 62.
62. "Epidemiology" is the "study of relationships between the frequency and distri-
bution, and the factors that may influence frequency and distribution, of diseases and
injuries in human populations." Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health
Hazards, supra note 2, at 163.
63. See Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrat-
ing Cause-In-Fact, 7 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 429, 431-32 (1983).
64. The uncertainty inherent in epidemiological study derives from a variety of fac-
tors, which are associated with either statistical limitations or limitations in drawing a
causal connection. For example, low risks may not be statistically distinguishable from
background levels of the condition studied. See McElveen & Eddy, Cancer and Toxic
Substance.v The Problem of Causation and the Use of Epidemiology, 33 Clev. St. L. Rev.
29, 39 (1984-85). Thus, demonstrating a significant statistical risk to warrant the infer-
ence of a causal connection may be particularly problematic for early claimants who
enter the legal system seeking relief prior to the establishment of a sufficient epidemiologi-
cal data base on their injury. See Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 732, 776-78 (1984) (discussing "first-case" phenomenon).
Low levels of risk in some instances may be associated with low doses of a suspected
toxin. Extrapolation of the effects from high doses to low doses will not necessarily result
in an accurate estimate of risk. For a discussion of this problem within the context of
ionizing radiation in the workplace, see McElveen & Eddy, supra, at 41 (noting that
complicating factors may be ability of DNA to repair itself at low doses and uncertainty
as to extent dividing dose may reduce carcinogenic effect of substance). With respect to
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the level of risk that certain segments of the population face for con-
tracting a particular disease or other disorder.6
Epidemiological studies may survey large segments of the general pop-
ulation to measure the occurrence rates of certain specific illnesses or
conditions. The results of such studies often can establish baseline levels
of the targeted conditions in the general population. 6 Occasionally,
such studies may uncover statistically significant clusters of illness that
warrant further study. In another variant, researchers may elect to ex-
amine a narrow subdivision of the population, such as workers exposed
to ionizing radiation.6 ' Epidemiological studies can be either prospective
or retrospective,68 with the former focusing on ongoing surveillance of a
given exposed population and the latter focusing on persons who have
developed a particular injury.69
Use of epidemiological studies to determine medical causation, how-
ever, can be problematic for several reasons. First, bias in the design of
causation, epidemiologists impose an element of subjective personal judgment on the sta-
tistical data in reaching a conclusion regarding the existence or nonexistence of a causa-
tive factor. See J. Mausner & S. Kramer, Epidemiology-An Introductory Text 180-87
(2d ed. 1985) (explaining epidemiologist's analysis of statistical association between factor
and disease to determine whether relationship is causal, spurious, or indirect). Because
the causal determination can be dependent upon evaluation of a multitude of factors, the
determination often may be open to various interpretations.
65. See Wegman & Giusti, Epidemiology, in Occupational Health: Recognizing and
Preventing Work-Related Disease 51, 51 (B. Levy & D. Wegman 1st ed. 1983).
66. See Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note
2, at 163.
67. See id. at 163-64.
68. Prospective studies, often called cohort studies, typically survey populations of
exposed individuals to determine whether those individuals have an increased risk over
the general nonexposed population of developing disease. See Gordis, Epidemiologic Ap-
proaches for Studying Human Diseases in Relation to Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 25
Hous. L. Rev. 837, 839 (1988). Assuming that the nonexposed population will manifest
disease levels, the risk associated with the exposure surveyed is determined by comparing
the rate of particular diseases in the exposed population to the background rates of the
same diseases in the nonexposed population. If this comparison yields a "relative risk"
rate that is higher in the exposed population, the degree to which the incidence of disease
is greater in the exposed population is examined to determine whether a causal associa-
tion can be drawn between the exposure and the elevated incidence of disease. See id. at
840. Epidemiologists first determine the "attributable risk," which reflects the difference
between the background levels of the disease in the nonexposed population and the level
of the disease in the exposed population. They then undertake a more subjective analysis
to test the plausibility of the proposed causal connection and either discount or incorpo-
rate confounding factors. See id. at 840-43.
Unlike prospective studies, retrospective, or case-control studies, typically begin by
identifying individuals who have contracted a particular disease and compare the charac-
teristics of the group identified with a group of individuals who have not contracted the
disease. See id. at 838. Case-control studies are particularly susceptible to bias in design
of the study, as where the researcher has in mind an association between a particular
exposure and the disease and selects a disease group and control group reflecting that
bias. See id. at 838-39.
69. See Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note
2, at 164-65.
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the study can impair researchers' ability to obtain accurate results.7"
Second, epidemiological studies are dependent upon a sufficiently large
sample size to reveal subtle, yet significant, statistical variations that may
identify a causal relationship.71 Results must be distinguishable from
background levels of the disease or disorder in the general population.
Studies of worker populations are necessarily small, frequently masking
relationships that might otherwise be apparent had the sample size been
larger.72 Furthermore, the effect of a long latency period-particularly
problematic in the case of genetic injury-may produce false negatives if
the study has not accurately estimated an appropriate time period for
manifestation of the condition.
Third, accurate analysis of reproductive and genetic injuries may be
difficult because infertility can result from a variety of dysfunctions in-
volving the male, the female, or the couple combined.73 Even where a
single source of infertility can be identified, such as male infertility, accu-
rate assessment of the injury may be obscured by inconsistent laboratory
procedures and disagreement among scientists as to the optimum param-
eters for study.74 A single toxic substance might affect reproduction at
multiple points, from conception through birth and development of the
offspring.75 Often, reproductive or genetic injuries are so rare in the pop-
70. See Wegman & Giusti, supra note 65, at 63.
71. See Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note
2, at 166-67.
For example, in order to detect a twofold increase in the spontaneous abortion
rate (during the period from the point at which a pregnancy is recognized to 20
weeks gestation), 161 pregnancies are needed in both the exposure group and
the control group. In order to study this many pregnancies, the investigator
must draw ... from a population of more than 11,000 workers to find a suffi-
cient number of pregnancies to study.
Id. (citing Rosenberg, Feldblum, Shy & Marshall, Epidemiologic Surveillance of Occupa-
tional Effects on Reproduction, Office of Technology Assessment, Contract Rep. (1984)).
72. See id. at 166.
73. See Office of Technology Assessment, Infertility, supra note 24, at 36: Conkling,
The Long Road from Infertility to Fatherhood, L.A. Times, Mar. 14, 1991, at E20, col. 1;
Ellis, New Infertility Treatment Returns Patients to Work Faster, Reuter Libr. Rep., June
4, 1991. See generally supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text (discussing infertility).
74. See Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note
2, at 165. Other difficulties arise in the study of spontaneous abortions:
It has been estimated that only about 31 percent of all fertilized eggs survive to
term: about 16 percent do not make the first cell division, another 15 percent
are lost during the first week, and a further 27 percent during implantation. By
the time of the first missed menstrual period, only about 42 percent of the fertil-
ized eggs have survived. Many women thus spontaneously abort without realiz-
ing that they have been pregnant.
Id. (citations omitted). A survey based upon the number of reported spontaneous abor-
tions would not accurately reflect the total number of actual spontaneous abortions.
Thus, accurate analysis of the relationship between a particular exposure and spontane-
ous abortion could be obscured, depending upon the parameters selected for study and
the limitations of medical capabilities.
75. For example, mercury may cause spontaneous abortion, a low birth weight, con-
genital malformation, and the abnormal development of the nervous system. See Office
of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note 2, at 72. Similarly,
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ulation that epidemiological study would require a prohibitively large
population sample to determine the existence of a causal relationship.1
6
These problems are exacerbated in cases of genetic injury, which can be
expressed randomly in a variety of manifestations.77
Fourth, confounding factors7 can impede accurate analysis of statisti-
cal information obtained through epidemiological studies. Cigarette
smoking is the classic confounding factor in many epidemiological stud-
ies generally. In studies of human reproductive function in particular,
male factors and age of the couple are common confounding factors.79
Finally, epidemiological studies generally are not favored for the study
of genetic workplace injuries. Occupationally induced genetic disorders
often are indistinguishable from spontaneous mutations in the general
population. 0 In addition, epidemiological surveillance of the offspring of
exposed workers would entail prohibitively long periods of time and
would incur great expense.8"
2. Toxicological Studies
Toxicological studies may offer some advantages over epidemiological
studies. These studies are conducted both in vitro and in vivo on ani-
mals, resulting in correlative associations between human disease and ex-
posure to certain substances.8 2 The ability of the researcher to control
the exposure dose and route gives toxicological studies an advantage over
epidemiological studies.8 3 Any conclusions regarding human exposure
and response, however, must derive from statistical extrapolation from
the animal or in vitro data to the projected human responses.
Critics of animal testing discount the value of such tests by noting sig-
nificant differences between the human reproductive system and the re-
productive systems of frequently used test animals.8 4 Moreover, these
critics have challenged the underlying assumption that dose-disease rela-
tionships observed in animal studies are predictive of similar relation-
ships between humans and their exposure to certain substances. The
preponderance of variables-such as genetic predisposition to disease or
alcohol consumption also has been associated with spontaneous abortion, as well as with
physical and developmental abnormalities in offspring. See id.
76. See Wegman & Giusti, supra note 65, at 64; Office of Technology Assessment,
Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note 2, at 166-67 & table 6.2.
77. See Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note
2, at 165.
78. A "confounding factor" is a "variable that is correlated with both exposure and
outcome. It can therefore partially or wholly account for an apparent effect of the expo-
sure levels under study or mask an underlying true association." Id. at 167.
79. See id.
80. See Brusick, supra note 50, at 109.
81. See id.
82. See Office of Technology Assessment, Genetic Monitoring, supra note 9, at 60.
83. See Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note
2, at 167.
84. See id. at 168.
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dysfunction 8 -that could enter into the equation dilutes the merit of
strict mathematical extrapolation. 6 Nevertheless, animal studies may
prove useful in suggesting a causal relationship between certain environ-
mental substances and reproductive and genetic diseases and disorders.8 7
The short-term bioassay, commonly known as the Ames test, examines
the effects of suspected mutagenic agents 8 on rapidly reproducing bacte-
ria in vitro. 9 Some analysts have expressed concern that the test is un-
derinclusive because mutagenic substances may kill some cells and
because the test cannot measure mutations unless the cell is viable."°
Moreover, due to the large amounts of the suspected mutagen that must
be used in the test, critics have complained that the test yields a high
percentage of false positives. 9 ' Finally, extrapolation down to achieve
prediction of low-dose hazards has been subject to conflicting
standards. 92
Both animal toxicological studies and short-term bioassays are com-
monly used by researchers studying environmental genetic mutations, as
epidemiological studies can prove overly protracted and costly.93 The
processes by which the various toxicological testing methods are used to
predict genetic risk to either human somatic cells or germ cells are un-
dergoing constant reevaluation and improvement. 94 Toxicological stud-
ies have suggested an association between reproductive injuries and
exposure to toxins in the workplace, and many scientists believe in the
reliability of such studies." Thus, despite their flaws, such studies may
85. See id. at 170.
86. See generally id. at 168-70 (discussing the general considerations of toxicological
studies). An associated concept is the belief among the scientific community that certain
threshold, or resistance, levels exist for toxic substances. See id. at 170.
87. For example, rodent studies have proven to be particularly useful in determining
the causes of some genetic mutations in humans. See D. Brusick, supra note 50, at 110.
88. The Ames test can demonstrate direct mutagenic effects. To a great extent, how-
ever, mutagenic results correlate with carcinogenicity. See Office of Technology Assess-
ment, Genetic Monitoring, supra note 9, at 61 (reporting that 85% of substances
carcinogenic to rodents are mutagenic in Ames test).
89. Typically, the test
involves treating a bacterial cell population containing a designated genetic
marker with a mutagen. The mutagen kills off a fraction of the cell population
with survivors growing back into a larger population. Within this survivor pop-
ulation, a fraction of the cells will have lost the marker. This fraction, ex-
pressed as a percentage, is taken as a measure of the mutagenic action suffered
by the original population.
Id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id
93. See D. Brusick, supra note 50, at 109-10.
94. See generally id at 110-22 (presenting approaches to definition of genetic risk).
95. See generally Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards,
supra note 2, at 67-104 (reporting studies that demonstrate the effects of specific chemi-
cals on the reproductive function).
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prove valuable in establishing the risk of injury presented by some work-
place toxins.
D. Scientific Uncertainty Breeds Legal Obstacles
The nature of reproductive and genetic injuries, coupled with the tech-
nological limitations of scientific inquiry, have created an almost unprec-
edented level of uncertainty for the legal system. Accordingly,
application of traditional legal doctrines to these issues may prove fruit-
less for claimants and may operate as a windfall for employers. Perhaps
because these workplace injuries mimic injuries to the population at
large, the legal community has been slow to recognize them as a discrete
category of injuries compensable under either the tort or workers' com-
pensation regimes.
96
The problems inherent in the scientific processes of investigation
render a legal determination of a causal relationship between an occupa-
tional exposure and a reproductive or genetic injury difficult.97 The level
of certainty required to pronounce a causal relationship in scientific en-
deavors is much higher, however, than the preponderance of the evidence
standard employed to establish legal causation in civil jurisprudence in
this country. Even so, the legal system has been reluctant to recognize a
causal relationship in the absence of scientific concurrence. Courts are
sharply divided on the value of permitting epidemiological and toxicolog-
ical studies to be introduced into evidence on proof of general causation,
absent significant corroborating evidence of specific causation.98
The conflict between medical and legal causation is being played out in
both the workers' compensation and tort liability forums. The inherent
natures of the workers' compensation and tort systems have deterred ef-
forts to establish a niche for reproductive and genetic workplace injuries
in the remedial structure of the American legal system. As will be dis-
cussed below, both the tort and compensation systems carry with them
96. The scientific community has manifested a similar reluctance in its pervasive dis-
interest in the scientific study of the effects of industrial toxins on the reproductive sys-
tems of employees. Moreover, public misperception of reproductive and genetic injuries
may indirectly inhibit research by directing funding initiatives away from these endeav-
ors. Certain reproductive harms-particularly infertility and spontaneous abortion-tra-
ditionally have been viewed as a lesser concern to society, possibly because these harms
are erroneously considered neither life-threatening nor disabling to the worker. Genetic
injuries are often viewed as abstract and theoretical because they may not be manifested
until future generations, yet the danger to workers and their progeny is concrete.
97. Commentators have observed the difficulties in attempting to define such terms as
"adverse health effects," "early health impairment," and even "death" within the context
of epidemiological studies: "Is a lung function test abnormal when it is less than 80
percent of predicted or when it is less than 75 percent of predicted?... Is cause of death
as listed on a death certificate accurate?" Wegman & Giusti, supra note 65, at 65.
98. Compare Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.) (allowing
case to go to jury on epidemiological evidence and testimony of treating physicians), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984) with Cook v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Cal.
1982) (disallowing claim based upon epidemiological evidence).
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archaic baggage and are characterized by overmythologized presump-
tions. Any effort to carve a remedial niche for reproductive and genetic
workplace injuries must necessarily confront these myths and
presumptions.
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE EXISTING REMEDIAL SCHEME FOR Toxic
WORKPLACE INJURIES
Although the OSH Act99 vests primary regulatory authority for
rulemaking and enforcement related to workplace hazards in the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), it does not grant
OSHA or any other agency the authority to compensate victims of occu-
pational injury or disease."° Instead, it expressly reserves any existing
remedial schemes available under state or federal law.101 With rare ex-
ceptions, 10 2 state workers' compensation programs and tort liability
schemes are the primary, and typically the exclusive, avenues of recovery
for workers injured in the workplace. Trapped in ancient modes and
presumptions, these remedial schemes are inadequate to resolve the legal
issues presented by toxic reproductive and genetic injuries.10 3
A. The Paradox of Workers' Compensation
Workers' compensation was designed to grant expedited-if not com-
plete--compensation to workers injured during the course of employ-
ment without requiring employees to demonstrate employer fault. " In
theory, the compensation system treats the costs of worker injuries as a
cost of production to be passed to the consumer.' 0 5 At its inception,
workers' compensation contemplated remuneration for accidental inju-
99. OSH Act, supra note 3, §§ 651-78.
100. See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 61-62.
101. See OSH Act, supra note 3, § 653(4).
102. State law does not always allow recovery for individuals injured in the workplace.
For example, coal miners suffering from pneumoconiosis were often unable to collect
benefits for death or disability under state compensation plans. Congress specifically ad-
dressed the coal miners' inability to recover benefits under state law when it enacted
legislation to allow recovery for death or disability due to pneumoconiosis. See 30 U.S.C.
§ 901(a) (1988).
103. See generally OSH Act, supra note 3, § 651 (addressing need to assure safe and
healthful working conditions).
104. See Haas, On Reintegrating Workers' Compensation and Employers' Liability, 21
Ga. L. Rev. 843, 846-48 (1987).
105. 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 2.20, at 5 (1990). One commenta-
tor has stated that "[i]n a very real sense, those who work in a contaminated environment
sacrifice their health to the profit of employers who, for whatever reason, do not provide a
healthy workplace," thus rendering it appropriate to charge the employer and the em-
ployer's product's consumers with the costs of compensation of work-related injuries.
Robblee, The Dark Side of Workers' Compensation: Burdens and Benefits in Occupa-
tional Disease Coverage, 2 Indus. Rel. L.J. 596, 623 (1978).
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ries only. 10 6 Eventually, however, occupational disease, 107 to one degree
or another, came to fall within the rubric of compensable injuries under
the state workers' compensation statutes. 10 8
Workers' compensation was aimed at offering a compromise to both
employers and employees as a means of avoiding the perceived failures of
tort law. No-fault liability and abrogation of the common-law defenses
of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow-servant
rule benefitted the employee, 109 as did an overall speedier resolution of
the claim than occurs in the civil litigation process. The employer
benefitted from a reduction in overall accident costs by receiving both
statutory limitations on employee recovery as well as immunity from tort
liability.110 A related but broader social aim of workers' compensation
was industrial safety. Employers faced with the high expense of multiple
compensation claims presumably would elect to invest in workplace
safety measures rather than continue to risk the financial uncertainty and
unprofitability of industrial accidents.'
These underlying presumptions of the workers' compensation system,
however, break down when applied to toxic reproductive and genetic in-
juries in the workplace. Although workers' compensation was created to
help workers recover for injuries suffered on the job, the requirements of
these statutes hinder recovery for toxic reproductive and genetic injuries
sustained in the workplace. First, because of the nature of these injuries,
claimants may not be able to satisfy the prerequisites for coverage. 12
Second, an injured worker may have difficulty demonstrating the neces-
106. Larson, Occupational Diseases Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 9 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 87, 87 (1974).
107. Initially, interest in occupational disease in this country arose in the 1930s with
public awareness of the relationship of silicosis to employment. Legislation designed to
provide compensation for silicosis victims proved unsatisfactory for claimants because it
catered to industry. See Robblee, supra note 105, at 599-600. The silicosis situation was
representative of the general climate of limitation and suspicion that other work-related
diseases encountered. See id. at 600.
108. Professor Larson has noted that in 1914, one court stated its inability to identify
any cases in which the common law allowed recovery for occupational disease. See Lar-
son, supra note 106, at 87 (quoting Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Works, 182
Mich. 157, 159, 148 N.W. 485, 486 (1914)). The bias of the workers' compensation sys-
tem, therefore, reflected this bias at common law. The bias derived from several sources.
Originally, occupational disease was deemed to be associated with the standard condi-
tions of employment, rather than employer misbehavior. See id. Second, the potential
scope of occupational disease claims raised the question whether their inclusion within
workers' compensation would impose a financial drain on the system. See id. at 88.
109. See Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 916,
918 (1980).
110. See Maakestad & Helm, Promoting Workplace Safety and Health in the Post-Reg-
ulatory Era: A Primer on Non-OSHA Legal Incentives That Influence Employer Decisions
To Control Occupational Hazards, 17 N. Ky. L.J. 9, 18 (1989).
111. Peirce & Dworkin, Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease: A Return
to Original Intent, 67 Or. L. Rev. 649, 653 (1988).
112. See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
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sary showing of work-relatedness of the illness.113 Third, the availability
of compensation benefits is drastically reduced because many employees
who develop reproductive or genetic injuries are not physically disabled
from work.114 Fourth, procedural obstacles may block recovery for these
injuries.115 Finally, the exclusivity rules of workers' compensation stat-
utes may bar workers from bringing common-law tort actions against
their employers even if the injuries involved are not compensable under
the relevant statute.1 16 The inequalities that exist for victims of repro-
ductive and genetic workplace injuries undermine the compensation and
deterrence goals of workers' compensation.
1. Impediments to Coverage
Victims of reproductive and genetic injuries encounter several cover-
age problems under existing workers' compensation statutes. First, these
statutes only compensate injuries that occur in the course of the employ-
ment relationship." 7 With some reproductive and genetic injuries, the
latency period from the time of the worker's exposure to the manifesta-
tion of the injury can be of considerable length, often going beyond the
period of employment. This characteristic, coupled with the background
frequency of reproductive and genetic dysfunction in the general popula-
tion, can mask a true workplace injury, thus preventing coverage under
the workers' compensation scheme.
The principal difficulty faced by reproductively or genetically injured
workers is proving that exposure to workplace toxins caused their inju-
ries. Because such injuries frequently masquerade as "ordinary diseases
of life," an employer may have little or no basis for agreeing that the
injury could be characteristic of or peculiar to the workplace environ-
ment. This dilemma is complicated by the possibility that some repro-
ductive or genetic injuries could have multiple causes, some within the
workplace and some outside it.1 ' Some workers' compensation statutes
have attempted to address this problem by expressly allowing recovery if
the worker has been exposed to a substance in the workplace for a certain
amount of time.' 19 Such provisions, while solving problems on one end
113. See infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 147-76 and accompanying text.
117. See 2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 65.13, at 12-13 (1990). If a
disease is manifested after the employment relationship terminates, but was caused by an
exposure during the course of employment, workers' compensation should be the exclu-
sive remedy. See Gideon v. Johs-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1145 (5th Cir.
1985). In Gideon, the Fifth Circuit held that the state workers' compensation statute
provided the exclusive remedy for an asbestos insulation worker against an employer for
whom he had worked from 1944 to 1969. See id. The plaintiff developed asbestosis sub-
sequent to termination of the employment relationship, but was nevertheless held to the
exclusivity requirement of the workers' compensation statute. See id.
118. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
119. See Cal. Lab. Code § 5500.5 (West 1989); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 342.316(10)(a)
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of the spectrum, may create problems on the other end. Thus, some
more acute injuries that may be directly employment-related may not be
covered, whereas those with a longer latency period would fall within the
coverage requirements.
120
Second, many state workers' compensation statutes require that for an
occupational disease to be compensable, it must be of the type that is
associated specifically with the occupation, rather than with everyday life
more generally. To this end, occupational diseases may be expressly
scheduled in the compensation statute. 12' The appearance of a disease in
a schedule creates a presumption that the disease is adequately associated
with a particular workplace so as to merit compensation within the statu-
tory scheme. Nonscheduled occupational diseases, however, also may
fall within the compensation scheme if the particular disease is "peculiar
to" the worker's occupation.122 For example, the Michigan workers'
compensation statute provides coverage for illnesses that "are character-
istic of and peculiar to the business of the employer... [;] [O]rdinary
disease[s] of life to which the public is generally exposed outside of the
employment [are] not compensable."' 123
Third, some workers' compensation statutes require the claimant to
have worked for a specified minimum period of time before the occupa-
tional disease claim will be covered. 24 Victims of many reproductive
and genetic injuries, therefore, may be effectively foreclosed from com-
pensation if their injuries manifest themselves before the statutory time
has elapsed.
Finally, state workers' compensation coverage is expressly directed to-
(Michie Bobbs-Merrill 1983); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:1031.1(D) (West 1985); Mont.
Code Ann. § 39.72.102(10) (1991); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 617.430 (Michie 1992). The
Idaho workers' compensation statute relieves an employer of compensation liability for
any "nonacute" occupational disease if the employee was exposed to the hazard in the
employer's workplace for less than 60 days. Idaho Code § 72-439 (1989). The term
"nonacute" is not defined in the statute.
120. Very long latency periods from time of exposure until manifestation of the injury
create special problems for claimants, particularly in the area of proof. See infra notes
233-65 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77, § 1208 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1991) (listing dis-
eases within the scope of the term "occupational disease" as used in the statute).
122. Many statutes exclude any diseases of ordinary life. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 11-9-
601(e)(1) (1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-108(3) (1986); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 2301(4)(1985); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 440.151(0(2) (West 1981); Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-280(2) (1988);
Idaho Code § 72-438 (1989); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, para. 172.36(d) (Smith-Hurd 1986);
Ind. Code Ann. § 22-3-7-10(a) (Burns 1992); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-5a01(b) (1986); Md.
Lab. & Empl. Code Ann. § 9-101(g) (1991); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 176.66 (West 1966); Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 287.067 (Vernon 1965); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-151(3) (1988); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 281:2(V) (1987); N.D. Cent. Code § 65-01-02(7)(a) (1985); S.C. Code Ann. § 42-
11-10(4) (Law. Co-op. 1985); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1002(5) (1987); Va. Code Ann.
§ 65.2-400 (1991); W. Va. Code § 23-4-1 (1985).
123. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 418.401(2)(b) (1985 & West Supp. 1991-92).
124. See Edwards, Worker Right-To-Know Laws: Ineffectiveness of Current Policy-
Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 15 B.C. Envtl. Aft. L. Rev. 1, 32-33 (1987)
(discussing various state laws).
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ward employees, while reproductive and genetic injuries may affect
spouses and offspring of exposed workers. Typically, independent con-
tractors and persons present in the workplace, but not in an employment
capacity, are excluded from coverage under workers' compensation stat-
utes. 125 Similarly, spouses, children, and others with illnesses or disor-
ders resulting from a worker's exposure to workplace toxins generally
will be limited to the tort system for redress of their individual injuries.
2. Problems of Proof
Even when a worker meets the technical coverage requirements of the
relevant workers' compensation statute, the worker may be barred from
compensation by serious problems of proof. While a claimant may be
able to adequately demonstrate that exposure to a particular substance in
the workplace is toxic to the human reproductive system, the claimant
may be unsuccessful in proving that the specific injury was in fact related
to that occupational exposure. This work-relatedness issue is the com-
pensation system's analog to proof of proximate cause in a civil negli-
gence action. Many of the problems are identical within both systems for
persons with occupational reproductive or genetic injuries.
Most states impose the burden of proving work-related causation upon
the claimant.126 In occupational disease cases, the claimant must intro-
duce clinical medical evidence to support the claim of specific causation
of the disease or disorder. 127 Thus, the statistical probabilities offered by
epidemiological studies may not be sufficient to prove the necessary
work-relatedness of the claimant's reproductive or genetic injury. In
other toxic-exposure cases, in which the injury claimed was cancer,
workers' compensation boards and courts often have denied coverage
based upon insufficient proof of a causal connection.128 The rare excep-
125. See IC A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 44.33(b), at 8-119-30
(1991).
126. See McCreary v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 22, 24 (Jan. 28, 1992);
Board of Educ. of Chicago v. Industrial Comm'n, 83 I11. 2d 475, 479, 416 N.E.2d 237,
238 (1981); Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d 903, 905 (Iowa 1974); Peirce &
Dworkin, supra note 111, at 662.
127. See Haynes v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Ariz. App. 559, 562, 509 P.2d 631, 633
(1973); Neas v. Snapp, 221 Tenn. 325, 331, 426 S.W.2d 498 (1968); General Chem. Div.,
Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Fasano, 47 Del. 546, 549, 94 A.2d 600, 602 (1953); Rob-
blee, supra note 105, at 602.
128. See Miller v. National Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, 283, 168 N.E-2d 811, 814, 204
N.Y.S.2d 129, 133 (1960) (benzene). A related problem in toxic-exposure cases is that of
dual causation and pre-existing conditions. This issue arises when the claimed injury
may have arisen from both a workplace exposure and another, non-work related source.
For example, when a worker develops lung cancer or other respiratory illness from an
exposure to air-borne fumes in the workplace, but was a smoker, the question arises as to
whether the illness is compensable under the state workers' compensation statute as
work-related. Similarly, a spontaneous abortion could have several causes, including the
workplace exposure of the mother to a hazardous substance. Due to the general high
incidence of background mortality of embryos, the exposed worker may have considera-
ble difficulty proving that the workplace exposure contributed to any degree to the injury.
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tions to the specific-causation rule have been where a traumatic work-
place event is followed by an almost immediate onset of disease,129 an
improbable, albeit not impossible, situation within the realm of toxic re-
productive and genetic injuries. Moreover, the claimant's burden of
proof is not mitigated by a lack of existing scientific knowledge as to the
causal connection between a toxic substance and the injury. 130
These proof problems are especially onerous when the disease is char-
acterized by a long latency period. One unique characteristic of latent
reproductive injuries is that some potential claimants may not discover
infertility problems until they become involved in reproductive efforts
many years after exposure. To meet proof requirements, the claimant
must produce evidence showing the extent of exposure, the absence of
the problem prior to the occupational exposure, and the elimination of
other potential contributing causes outside of the employment environ-
ment.13 1 For example, such factors as age and heredity can inhibit a
finding of coverage for a reproductive or genetic injury.1 32 The difficulty
of such proof requirements is exacerbated by the frequent unavailability
of employer records regarding the extent of occupational exposure.1 33
3. Limitations on Benefits
Once a worker overcomes the coverage and proof hurdles of the rele-
vant workers' compensation statute, the worker still may have inade-
The employer, on the other hand, may be unable to identify other contributing causes of
the injury because current medical knowledge cannot identify with certainty most causes
of early spontaneous abortions. How should the law treat this situation? If the claimant
can come forth with proof of general causation-that is, that the workplace hazard has
been statistically linked to spontaneous abortions-the burden should be placed upon the
employer to disprove work-relatedness or to identify multiple-causation factors or a pre-
existing condition. In this manner, the safety goals of the workers' compensation system
can remain intact. Depending upon the jurisdiction, the employer may then argue that
apportionment should be applied to the claim. For the argument that existing judicial
treatment of dual causation and pre-existing condition claims results in overinclusive pay-
ment of workers' claims and that current state apportionment statutes are improperly
utilized, see Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 111, at 667-78.
129. See Robblee, supra note 105, at 603 (discussing Volk v. Birdseye Div., 16 Or.
App. 349, 518 P.2d 672 (1974) (broccoli dusted within unknown substance in eye) and
Valente v. Bourne Mills, 77 R.I. 274, 75 A.2d 191 (1950) (breast injury from flying object
in which no medical evidence had been submitted to prove causation, but in which com-
pensation was allowed)).
130. See Robblee, supra note 105, at 605.
131. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
132. See Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 111, at 663.
133. Current federal regulations concerning employer recordkeeping requirements
may provide assistance for employees seeking their personal exposure records. The fed-
eral regulations provide that employers must transfer all employee exposure and medical
records to successor employers. In the event of company dissolution, the employer must
notify the affected employees of their right of access to the records. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 19.20(h) (1990). While such regulations are useful prospectively, they are of very lim-
ited use retrospectively, particularly for persons exposed many years ago. For a discus-
sion of the merits of these regulations, see Gelman, Compensable Industrial Disease a
Catching Idea, 125 N.J.L.J. 748 (1990).
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quate relief. This is because the benefits available to an injured worker
under state workers' compensation schemes generally are limited to those
relating to economic loss and disability." By the very nature of the
workers' compensation compromise, compensation is not available for
pain and suffering. While deemed appropriate for the accidental or trau-
matic injury contemplated by the original drafters of workers' compensa-
tion legislation, this compensation limitation is unsuitable for
reproductive and genetic injuries.
Indeed, the typical benefits schemes fail to provide adequate compen-
sation to the victim of reproductive and genetic occupational injuries for
several reasons. First, the concept of a disability contemplates an inabil-
ity to perform work activities. A worker's infertility, sexual dysfunction,
or spontaneous abortion, for example, may result in no disability from
work, even though the injury may be severe. Second, medical expenses
contemplate nothing more than reimbursement or payment for actual
out-of-pocket expenses incurred. Thus, the worker may be denied com-
pensation for the true losses associated with reproductive injury.
Furthermore, state workers' compensation statutes typically limit
medical benefits to those that are reasonably required or necessary.'3
Thus, payment for medical treatment that directly relates to the health of
the worker will be covered, provided that the treatment has a reasonable
expectation of success. Workers suffering from occupational reproductive
and genetic injuries will confront considerable obstacles to treatment for
their injuries. If the jurisdiction defines "necessary" as required to pro-
tect the life and health of the worker, tribunals could refuse to compen-
sate claimants for most infertility and pregnancy-related treatments,
many of which are prohibitively expensive and which may not be covered
by any health insurance carried by the claimant." 6 Moreover, many
pregnancy-related treatments are intended to be therapeutic to the fetus.
Employers may attempt to argue that noncoverage is justifiable on the
ground that the treatment was for a noncovered third party rather than
for the mother's own health. 137
134. Typically, such benefits include loss of earnings, medical expenses, death, and
disability maintenance. See Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health
Hazards, supra note 2, at 289-91. In Michigan "'disability' means a limitation of an
employee's wage earning capacity resulting from a personal injury or work-related dis-
ease. The establishment of disability does not create a presumption of wage loss." Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 17.237(401) (Callaghan 1988).
135. See 2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 61.00 (1989).
136. See Office of Technology Assessment, Infertility, supra note 24, at 148-57.
137. Whether a jurisdiction would find in favor of the employer on this argument
would necessarily depend upon the state's definition of the commencement of human life.
This might vary from state to state. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492
U.S. 490, 506-07 (1989), the United States Supreme Court declined to rule on the consti-
tutionality of the preamble of a Missouri statute regulating abortion. See id. at 501 (con-
struing Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1.205.1(1),(2) (1990)). The preamble proclaims that "[t]he life
of each human being begins at conception" and provides that "unborn children have
protectable interests in life, health, and well-being." Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1.205.1(1),(2)
(1990). If such statutory proclamations withstand appropriate constitutional challenge,
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Treatments considered experimental in the medical profession are not
covered under workers' compensation. 3 ' Some infertility treatments,1 39
and virtually all gene therapy treatments, currently are experimental.
Even where not experimental, many infertility treatments, such as in vi-
tro fertilization, have statistically low success rates. Thus, the nature of
the treatments available for reproductive and genetic injuries could cause
tribunals to deny payment of such expensive treatments on the ground
that they are unlikely to succeed. 140
4. Procedural Issues
Workers with reproductive and genetic injuries also encounter many
procedural problems under existing workers' compensation laws. For
example, some state laws require that an occupational disease must man-
ifest itself within a specified period of time following either the last expo-
sure to the toxic substance or the employee's last day of work. 141 A long
latency period from time of exposure to manifestation of the disease
would preclude many claimants from obtaining compensation for repro-
ductive or genetic injuries. Indeed, genetic impairments can remain la-
tent for generations,' 42 thus preventing the exposed worker from ever
learning of the primary personal injury. By the time the defect does ap-
pear, it may be untraceable to the original work environment. Even if
the disorder is traceable, the likelihood is high that any statutory mani-
festation requirements will have expired by the time the disorder is
discovered.
Similarly, statutory limitation periods for the filing of compensation
claims can adversely and disparately impact claimants of reproductive or
genetic injuries. Initially, most states adopted strict limitation periods
that ran from the time of exposure. 43 Today, however, most states have
employers in the affected states could argue that embryos and fetuses are human beings
with rights distinct from-and potentially in conflict with-the women who carry them.
Such an argument could be counterproductive to the goals of the workers' compensation
system, if employers are permitted to refuse to compensate pregnant workers for preg-
nancy-related treatment necessitated by workplace exposures.
138. See 2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 61.13 (1989) (use of
"necessary" in statutory language impedes use of experimental techniques).
139. For example, the medical profession considers zygote intrafallopian transfer
("ZIFT") and peritoneal ovum and sperm transfer to be experimental. See Ethics
Comm. of Am. Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technolo-
gies, 53 Fertility & Sterility 55S (Supp. 2 1990).
140. See, e.g., Marks, Bressler & Marks, Recovery for Sexual Impairment Under Work-
ers' Compensation, 35 Fed'n of Ins. Couns. Q. 107, 114-17 (1985) (discussing case involv-
ing impairment of procreative ability in which authors were defense counsel).
141. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 11-9-702(2)(A) (1987) (disablement must occur
within three years of last exposure for silicosis or asbestosis); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, para.
172.36(f) (Smith-Hurd 1986) (disablement must occur within two years of last exposure
to most substances); S.C. Code Ann. § 42-11-70 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (disease must be
contracted within one year of last exposure to most substances).
142. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
143. See Gelman, supra note 133, at 756.
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amended their statutes to provide that a compensation claim for occupa-
tional disease accrues upon discovery of the disease or when the disease
could reasonably have been discovered, whichever is earlier.'" The
states vary as to when sufficient medical knowledge is imputed to the
claimant for accrual of the claim. In some states, mere diagnosis of the
disease may suffice;"4 ' in other states, the statute may not be triggered
until the first medical opinion is rendered tending to establish a causal
connection between the disease and the occupational setting.146
These liberal approaches to the discovery of disease, however, do not
offer much protection to victims of occupational reproductive and ge-
netic injuries. Because of the prevalence of infertility and spontaneous
abortion in the general population, a worker initially may have no reason
to believe that such a condition would be related to employment. Indeed,
it may not be until the worker suffers multiple spontaneous abortions, for
example, that she would begin to suspect an occupational exposure as the
source of the problem. Yet, employers in some jurisdictions could chal-
lenge the worker's claim as dilatory, arguing that an earlier date-per-
haps the time of the first spontaneous abortion-triggered the running of
the statutory period.
5. The Perils of Exclusivity
A major hurdle to relief that victims of reproductive and genetic inju-
ries face under existing workers' compensation laws is the exclusivity
doctrine. The foundation of the workers' compensation system, this doc-
trine provides that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for an
144. See, eg., Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-281 (1988 & Supp. 1991) (but not more than
seven years from last exposure); N.Y. Work. Comp. Law § 28 (McKinney Supp. 1992)
(within two years after disablement and after the claimant knew or should have known
that disease was due to nature of employment); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1006 (1987) (one
year from discovery for radiation, but all else five years from last exposure).
145. See N.D. Cent. Code § 65-05-01 (1985 & Supp. 1991); see also Ratliff v. Domin-
ion Coal Co., 3 Va. App. 175, 177, 349 S.E.2d 147, 149-50 (1986) (letter to coal miner
from Department of Labor that miner qualified under federal disability standards held to
be notice to miner to trigger running of statute of limitations); Carter v. Continental
Telephone Co., 373 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Iowa App. 1985) (employee's claim time barred
because company physician diagnosed disease earlier and informed claimant by letter
that it might be job related).
146. See N.Y. Work. Comp. Law § 28 (McKinney Supp. 1992); see also Henry v. In-
dustrial Comm'n of Ariz., 754 P.2d 1342, 1344-45, 157 Ariz- 67, 69-70 (1987) (statute of
limitations did not begin to run for police officer suffering post-traumatic stress until after
medical diagnosis, despite fact that incident occurred twenty-four years earlier and claim-
ant manifested symptoms and sought medical help two years after initial incident); Den-
nis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 745 P.2d 1295, 1301, 109 Wash. 2d 467, 473 (1987)
("The causal connection between a claimant's physical condition and his or her employ-
ment must be established by competent medical testimony which shows that the disease is
probably, as opposed to possibly, caused by employment."); Craddock v. Eagle Picher
Indus., 457 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ohio 1982) (court allowed claim filed four years after em-
ployee left work due to a disability, holding that "[d]isability due to an occupational
disease shall be deemed to have begun as of the date [of] ... medical diagnosis ... [or
other scenarios] .... whichever date is latest.").
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injured worker suffering from a covered, although not necessarily com-
pensable, occupational disease or injury.147 Exclusivity continues to
shield the employer even after termination of the employment relation-
ship, as in the case of latent onset of disease. The most severe effects of
the exclusivity doctrine occur in cases where the injury falls within a
compensation statute's coverage, but compensation is denied for lack of
proof of work-relatedness or for failure to satisfy a statute of limitations.
The inequitable operation of the exclusivity doctrine is exemplified by
Cole v. Dow Chemical Co., 48 in which the Michigan Court of Appeals
held that persons rendered sterile, allegedly as a result of occupational
exposure to the chemical DBCP, were barred from bringing a tort action
against their employer. The court found that the injured worker's claim
was covered under the state workers' compensation statute, even though
the injury was deemed to be noncompensable under the statute.1 49 The
worker was not physically disabled from employment and sought dam-
ages primarily for the emotional distress associated with the injury. 50
Employees seeking to avoid the strictures of the workers' compensa-
tion system by bringing independent civil actions against their employers
may have available a limited-but generally narrowly construed-set of
exceptions to the doctrine of exclusivity. These may include the excep-
tion for employer misconduct, the aggravation of injury exception, and
the dual-capacity employer exception.15' These exceptions may arise leg-
islatively or judicially. The legal community, in considering the inequita-
ble impact of the workers' compensation laws for toxic reproductive and
genetic injuries, should examine the role that these exceptions can play in
any reform efforts.
a. Employer Misconduct
Traditionally, the employer misconduct exception to exclusivity has
147. See 2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 65.14, at 12-15 (1990). Ex-
clusivity applies regardless of whether the worker made a claim for compensation as a
result of the injury. See id.
148. Cole v. Dow Chemical Co., 112 Mich. App. 198, 315 N.W.2d 565 (1982).
149. See id. at 206, 315 N.W.2d at 569.
150. See id. at 201, 315 N.W.2d at 567. In Cole, the plaintiffs argued that the exclusiv-
ity provision of the Michigan workers' compensation statute did not bar their tort actions
against the employer because their claims were not compensable under the workers' com-
pensation act. See id. at 204, 315 N.W.2d at 568. The court ruled that because the
plaintiffs' sterility is a physical injury, any damages claimed, including emotional distress,
arising out of the physical injury fall squarely within the workers' compensation cover-
age. See id. at 206, 315 N.W.2d at 569. The court distinguished other Michigan cases in
which the plaintiffs were allowed to maintain actions outside the workers' compensation
system on the ground that those actions did not involve physical or mental injuries. See
id. at 205-06, 315 N.W.2d at 568-69 (citations omitted). The dissent argued in favor of
limiting workers' compensation coverage to those disabilities resulting in the "inability to
perform labor, not inability to procreate." Id. at 207, 315 N.W.2d at 570 (Kelley, J.,
dissenting). Thus, the dissent placed this case within the category of actions distin-
guished by the majority as falling outside of the workers' compensation scheme. Id.
151. See infra notes 153-76 and accompanying text.
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been restrictively applied to injuries resulting from intentional acts of the
employer specifically directed toward the worker or from acts that the
employer knew with substantial certainty would result in injury to the
worker. 152 Neither gross negligence nor reckless conduct typically has
fallen within the exception.'53
In a radical departure from traditional law, the West Virginia Supreme
Court in Mandolidis v. Elkins Industrial, Inc.I expanded this exception
in 1978 by holding that willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct could
constitute deliberate intentional conduct under the state workers' com-
pensation act."55 The plaintiff in Mandolidis was injured while operating
a machine that was not equipped with a safety guard, allegedly in viola-
tion of state and federal safety laws and industry standards.' 5 6 The com-
plaint alleged that the employer's conduct was "wilful, wanton,
malicious, and [in] deliberate disregard for the well-being of the plaintiff
with a deliberate intention to injure or kill him.""' The court inter-
preted the intentional conduct exception in the West Virginia workers'
compensation law' to include the conduct alleged by the plaintiff: "In
our view when death or injury results from wilful, wanton or reckless
misconduct such death or injury is no longer accidental in any meaning-
ful sense of the word, and must be taken as having been inflicted with
deliberate intention for the purposes of the workmen's compensation
act."'1 59
Not long after the Mandolidis decision, however, the West Virginia
state legislature rejected the court's interpretation that any non-acciden-
152. See 2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 68.15 (1990). For a discus-
sion of the various judicial theories employed to justify the intentional conduct exception
to the doctrine of exclusivity, see Note, Employer Intentional Torts in Virginia: Proposal
For an Exception To the Exclusive Workers' Compensation Remedy, 25 U. Rich. L Rev.
339, 343-49 (1991). See also Webb, Intentional Act Exception to Workers' Compensation,
32 For the Defense 2 (June 1990) (providing comparison of judicial interpretations of
intent under state workers' compensation laws).
153. See Comment, Workers' Compensation - A Proposal to Protect Injured Workers
From Employers' Shield of Immunity, 20 St. Mary's LJ. 933, 942-43 (1989).
154. Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W.Va. 695, 705, 246 S.E.2d 907, 914
(1978).
155. See id. at 705, 246 S.E.2d at 914.
156. See id. at 707-08, 246 S.E.2d at 914-15. The plaintiff alleged a long list of com-
plaints regarding his employer's conduct with respect to the safety of the machines in the
workplace, including the allegation that the employer forced employees to operate the
machines without safety guards so that the production rate would increase, leading to
increased profits. See id. at 707-08, 246 S.F2d at 915.
157. Id. at 707, 246 S.E.2d at 915.
158. At the time of the Mandolidis decision, the relevant section of the West Virginia
workers' compensation statute provided:
If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate intention of his
employer to produce such injury or death, the employee... shall... have cause
of action against the employer, as if this chapter had not been enacted, for any
excess of damages over the amount received or receivable under this chapter.
W. Va. Code § 23-4-2 (1913), as amended by W. Va. Code § 23-4-2 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
159. Mandolidis, 161 W. Va. at 705, 246 S.E.2d at 914.
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tal conduct could satisfy the statutory exception for deliberate intentional
conduct. The legislature amended the workers' compensation act to pro-
vide that intent to injure the worker must be demonstrated for the claim
to fall outside of the exclusivity of workers' compensation." 6°
Judicial interpretation of the exception in other states generally has
not been as bold as the failed attempt in West Virginia. Nevertheless,
some courts have found the requisite intent in allegations of employer
deceit. An expansive interpretation is particularly suited to cases arising
from toxic workplace exposures, due to the latency period and the diffi-
culty in determining work-relatedness of the injury. Indeed, unscrupu-
lous or lax employers could benefit from the traditional narrow
construction because a former employee would be unable to determine
the precise cause of an injury or to reconstruct the precise working condi-
tions many years after the exposure.
Thus, in O'Brien v. Ottawa Silica Co.,1 61 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan relieved a worker from the
operation of the exclusivity doctrine when his employer was aware that
its employees were suffering from asbestos-related disease but concealed
that information. This withholding of specific medical information re-
garding the worker's personal health condition constituted sufficient in-
tentional fraud to fall outside of the exclusivity doctrine. 162
Recently, a Florida appellate court held that an employer's alleged de-
ceit in exposing employees to toxic substances without warnings or ap-
propriate safety measures constituted intentional conduct that brought
the action outside the state workers' compensation scheme. In Cunning-
ham v. Anchor Hocking Corp.,163 the court gave strict attention to the
specific wording of the plaintiffs' complaint and determined that the alle-
gations could reasonably be construed as stating intentional claims, thus
permitting a tort action against the employer. The court concluded:
[T]he complaint alleges that appellees diverted the smokestack so that
fumes would flow into, rather than outside of, the plant, and that they
periodically turned off the plant ventilation system, thereby intensify-
ing the level of exposure. The complaint further alleges that appellees
removed manufacturers' warning labels on toxic substance containers,
misrepresented the toxic nature of substances, and knowingly provided
inadequate safety equipment, while misrepresenting the danger or ex-
tent of toxicity in the plant and the need for proper safety
equipment....
[T]he allegations are that injury was "a substantial certainty" and
that there was repeated, continued exposure that was intentionally in-
160. See W. Va. Code § 23-4-2 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
161. See O'Brien v. Ottawa Silica Co., 656 F. Supp. 610, 611-12 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
162. Accord Koslop v. Cabot Corp., 631 F. Supp. 1494 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that
worker could maintain tort action where employer concealed results of plaintiff's X-ray
indicating medical condition associated with workplace exposure to beryllium).
163. Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So.2d 93, 95-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
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creased and worsened by appellees' deliberate and malicious conduct.
Accordingly, the counts sounding in battery, fraud and deceit... were
sufficient to state a cause of action outside the scope of workers' com-
pensation and should not have been dismissed.
164
The Cunningham case, however, leaves unclear the result if the con-
duct pleaded is less deliberately injurious, such as where an employer
recklessly ignores safety procedures and warnings but does not undertake
the affirmative steps that provided the basis for the Florida court's deci-
sion. Maintaining the traditional distinctions-between accidents and
non-accidents and between specific intent to injure and reckless endan-
germent-may no longer be reasonable in light of the new categories and
characteristics of injuries confronting the legal system from toxic work-
place exposures.
Notwithstanding these few inroads, most states adhere to the stricter,
more traditional interpretation of employer misconduct that requires spe-
cific intent to injure the worker. Thus, under current law, an employer's
failure to adequately warn workers of toxic exposures in the occupational
setting, together with concealment of scientific information associated
with the risk of harm, usually does not qualify as "intent" for purposes of
the employer misconduct exception.1 65
164. Id. at 96-97. The court refused, however, to allow the plaintiffs' claim for strict
liability based upon ultrahazardous activities, ruling that the claim did not constitute an
intentional tort. See id. at 97.
165. See, e.g., Wilson v. Asten-Hill Mfg., 791 F.2d 30, 32-33 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding
that employees exposed to asbestos failed to demonstrate requisite intent necessary under
intentional tort exception where employer withheld scientific data regarding risks of in-
halation of asbestos and failed to provide warnings of known risks); Miller v. Ensco, Inc.,
286 Ark. 458, 461, 692 S.W.2d 615, 617 (1985) (holding that employer's failure to warn
of risks or failure to provide safe working conditions deliberately placing employees in
hazardous positions in violation of government regulations does not fall within inten-
tional tort exception); Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1985) (hold-
ing that employer's failure to provide safe place to work is not an intentional tort unless
employer believes his conduct will cause injuries). In Miller v. Ensco, Inc., the plaintiff,
an employee in the defendant-employer's hazardous waste disposal facility, alleged that
his employer specifically and deliberately intended to injure him by exposing him to
PCBs without appropriate safety measures. 286 Ark. at 459, 692 S.W.2d at 616.
Although Arkansas recognized an intentional tort exception to the exclusivity of the state
workers' compensation provisions, the court held that the plaintiff's action fell outside
the exception and within the coverage of workers' compensation. See id. at 460-61, 692
S.W.2d at 617. The court stated that the acts alleged, rather than the language of the
complaint, were determinative of the issue. See id. Stating that "intentional torts involve
consequences which the actor believes are substantially certain to follow his actions," the
court concluded:
Here, the [employer's] failure to warn of dangers or failure to provide safe con-
ditions, deliberately placing [an employee] in a dangerous position and willfully
violating governmental regulations, does not bring the cause of action within
the ambit of an intentional tort. That type of activity by an employer, even
where flagrant, does not constitute an intentional tort for purposes of the exclu-
sivity provision of the workers' compensation act.
Id. Moreover, the court refused to adopt an aggravation-of-injury exception to exclusiv-
ity, as California had adopted in Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.
3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980), despite the fact that the plaintiff had
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b. Aggravation of Injury
Sometimes called the "dual injury" doctrine, the aggravation of injury
exception has been applied primarily in California and New Jersey. In
Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court,'66 the
California Supreme Court allowed a tort action brought by a worker
against his employer on the basis of asbestos exposure in the workplace.
The gravamen of the suit was that the employer had knowingly con-
cealed the hazards of the occupational exposure from the worker, thus
causing an aggravation of the physical condition of the employee. 167 Ad-
dressing the legal system's concerns that recognition of such an exception
would invite a flood of litigation, the court stated:
We conclude the policy of exclusivity of workers' compensation as a
remedy for injuries in the employment [setting] would not be seriously
undermined [by this exception], since we cannot believe that many em-
ployers will aggravate the effects of an industrial injury by not only
deliberately concealing its existence but also its connection with the
employment. Nor can we believe that the Legislature in enacting the
workers' compensation law intended to insulate such flagrant conduct
from tort liability. 168
This decision led to the amendment of the California workers' compensa-
tion statute to include an express exception to exclusivity for aggravation
of injury, but limiting recovery in a tort action to damages for aggrava-
tion only. 169
alleged that the employer had directed its physician not to test employees for the presence
of PCBs in their blood. See Miller, 286 Ark. at 262, 692 S.W.2d at 618. For a discussion
of the Johns-Manville case, see infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text. Similarly, in
Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404, 405-07 (Tex. 1985), the Texas Supreme Court
ruled that knowing failure to provide adequate safety measures, coupled with poor em-
ployee training and knowledge of prior injuries, constituted gross negligence, but did not
rise to the level of intentional misconduct.
166. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 468, 612 P.2d
948, 950, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 860 (1980).
167. The relevant portion in the workers' compensation statute provided that willful
misconduct of the employer was compensable under the statute by a one-half increase in
benefits. See id. at 469, 612 P.2d at 951, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 861. Thus, the court further
held that the plaintiff's claims of fraud and conspiracy with respect to his primary injury
were barred by the statute. See id. at 469, 612 P.2d at 950, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
168. Id. at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
169. The exception allows a tort action "[w]here the employee's injury is aggravated by
the employer's fraudulent concealment of the existence of the injury and its connection
with the employment, in which case the employers' liability shall be limited to those
damages proximately caused by the aggravation." Cal. Lab. Code § 3602(2) (West 1989).
In Barth v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 661 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Cal. 1987), the court
sought to define the term "aggravation" within the meaning of the statute. In Barth, the
plaintiff claimed that his employer had intentionally exposed him to benzene and other
workplace toxins, thus creating an increased risk of his developing various diseases and
genetic damage. See id. at 195. The court found that the plaintiff's initial injury had
been to his immune system, with aggravation of that injury in the form of "the presence
of diseases in their latency period." Id. at 196. The plaintiff was not suffering from any
disease at the time of the commencement of the action. Moreover, the court considered
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Similarly, in Millison v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,' 7° the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could bring an action for
aggravation of an existing asbestos-related injury against his employer,
but that he must demonstrate "a deliberate corporate strategy" of con-
cealment to prevail in the action. 7' The difficulty of sustaining this bur-
den of proof, however, may deter many would-be plaintiffs from
pursuing otherwise meritorious actions.
c. Dual Capacity
The dual capacity exception to the exclusivity doctrine permits the in-
jured employee to sue the employer in tort when the employer acts in an
additional, distinct role beyond that of employer. The classic example of
the dual capacity employer is where the employer is also the manufac-
turer of a product that injures the employee. 172 In the case of reproduc-
tive or genetic injuries, courts could conclude that an employer has acted
in the secondary capacity of health care provider if the employer has
assumed the obligation to monitor the health of its employees and to
provide medical diagnoses and care.1 73 In Duprey v. Shane, 74 an early
case involving this exception, an employee was allowed to bring a mal-
practice suit against his chiropractor-employer for mistreating a work-
place injury on the theory that the chiropractor was acting as a physician
rather than as an employer. 175
The few jurisdictions that recognize this exception have construed it
very narrowly, often requiring that the risk created by the employer in
the alternate capacity be one owed by the employer to the general pub-
lic.' 76 Thus, if an employer undertakes medical or genetic monitoring of
any related emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff to be a further aggravation of the
injury for purposes of delineating the damages available to him in his action. See id.
170. Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 NJ. 161, 501 A.2d 505 (1985).
171. Id. at 183, 501 A.2d at 517.
172. See M. Brown, ed., Toxic Torts and Product Liability: Changing Tactics for
Changing Times 100 (BNA Special Rep. 1989).
173. Courts are divided as to whether such activities by employers constitute a distinct
alternate capacity. See Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards,
supra note 2, at 317.
174. Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 789-94, 249 P.2d 8, 13-16 (1952).
175. See id. at 790, 249 P.2d at 13-14.
176. See, e.g., Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 107, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 797, 799 (1977) (holding that employee injured on scaffolding manufactured by
employer and offered for sale to general public was permitted to sue employer in tort);
Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1976), overruled by
Schump v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 44 Ohio St. 3d 148, 151, 541 N.E.2d 1040, 1044
(1989) (holding that employee could maintain tort action against employer because injury
arose out of duty owed by employer to general public). Both Mercer and Schump in-
volved an employee injured in the course of employment by a blowout of a tire manufac-
tured by the employer. The Ohio turnaround evidences both the general disfavor of the
dual capacity exception in product liability cases and the acknowledged difficulty courts
have experienced in justifying a separation of the duties owed by the product-manufactur-
ing employer. On the one hand, the employer must provide a safe workplace for its
employees; on the other hand, the employer owes the consumer a safe product. Courts
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an employee, the dual capacity exception arguably might not apply be-
cause the employer's duty does not extend to the monitoring of the gen-
eral population.
B. The Adverse Impact of Tort Law
Although workers' compensation was designed to allow workers to re-
cover for injuries sustained during the course of their employment, in
practice the workers' compensation system poses many obstacles to re-
covery for workers suffering from toxic reproductive and genetic injuries.
Unfortunately, the common-law tort scheme often fails to provide a relief
mechanism for workers suffering from these injuries as well. Most of
these employees will be prevented from commencing a common-law tort
action against their employers by the operation of the exclusivity rule of
the applicable workers' compensation statute. 177 Nevertheless, some em-
ployees may have available a cause of action in tort against their employ-
ers or third parties for the injuries sustained in the course of their
employment. Similarly, tort law may provide an avenue of relief for
some spouses and children of exposed workers.
1. Employee Actions Against Third Parties
In addition to filing for workers' compensation benefits, an injured em-
ployee may be able to commence a private action against a third party
who manufactured the hazardous substance to which the employee was
exposed in the course of employment. Based in products liability, this
action makes available to the employee theories of negligence, strict lia-
bility, and perhaps breach of warranty, as permitted under the law of the
relevant jurisdiction. There are, however, some universal roadblocks to
recovery under these theories.
Causation is the primary obstacle to recovery under either negligence
or strict liability for victims of reproductive or genetic injuries in the
workplace. 7 ' As in the workers' compensation context, the statistical
probabilities offered by epidemiological and toxicological studies may be
insufficient to establish legally cognizable individual causation unless
they are accompanied by clinical medical evidence that the plaintiff's
and commentators have had increasing difficulty justifying a dramatic departure from the
traditional operation of the workers' compensation scheme merely because the employee
is a user of the product during the course of employment. For a discussion of the abroga-
tion of dual capacity in light of the Ohio cases, see Note, Schump v. Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co.: The Demise of Dual Capacity: Equal Protection Implications of Workers'
Compensation Exclusivity as Applied to the Manufacturer-Employer, 19 Cap. U.L. Rev.
1229 (1991).
177. For a discussion of exclusivity and its exceptions, see supra notes 147-76 and ac-
companying text.
178. For an analysis of causation problems and policies in relation to reproductive and
genetic workplace injuries, see infra notes 298-317 and accompanying text.
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specific injury was connected to a specific occupational exposure.' 9
Availability of the state-of-the-art defense in negligence and strict lia-
bility actions is a second concern to workers or others bringing tort ac-
tions. This defense forecloses liability if the defendant acted in
accordance with state-of-the-art scientific knowledge at the time of the
employee's exposure18 0 Although at least one jurisdiction has refused to
allow state-of-the-art evidence in some toxic strict product liability suits
on the ground that the defendant's conduct is irrelevant,18' most jurisdic-
179. The report of the Office of Technology Assessment on reproductive hazards in the
workplace makes the following observations:
Clinical physicians are generally concerned with diagnosis and treatment,
whereas biomedical researchers and epidemiologists focus more on the etiology
of disease.... Thus, although animal studies may show a substance to be toxic
to an animal fetus, a clinician may be reluctant to draw conclusions based on
animal studies alone because of the considerable species variation in effects.
Doctors are also likely to stress the role of various environmental and genetic
factors outside of the workplace, notwithstanding the fact that such interactions
are likely to be legally irrelevant so long as the workplace exposure played a
substantial role in the reproductive harm.
Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards, supra note 2, at 323.
For a discussion of the problem of causation in the workers' compensation context, see
supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
180. Although industry custom is relevant in determining the state-of-the-art in a
given industry with respect to a particular substance, industry custom is not necessarily
determinative. See Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards,
supra note 2, at 307-08. This rule prevents an industry from artificially setting the state of
the art at an unsafe level when safer practices could be developed. When raised in strict
product liability cases, the state-of-the-art defense is one example of the infusion of negli-
gence principles into the law of strict liability. Because state-of-the-art is essentially fault-
based, the defendant's conduct at the relevant point in time will be scrutinized for its
propriety in relation to the health of the class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs.
181. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204-09, 447 A.2d 539,
546-49 (1982). Beshada was an asbestos product liability lawsuit brought by an insula-
tion worker. The New Jersey Supreme Court refused to allow the defendant to rely upon
the state-of-the-art defense in the failure-to-warn case and emphasized that the safety of
the product, rather than the behavior of the defendant, is the relevant consideration. See
id at 204, 447 A.2d at 546. The court stated:
When the defendants argue that it is unreasonable to impose a duty on them
to warn of the unknowable, they misconstrue both the purpose and effect of
strict liability. By imposing strict liability, we are not requiring defendants to
have done something that is impossible. In this sense, the phrase "duty to
warn" is misleading. It implies negligence concepts with their attendant focus
on the reasonableness of defendant's behavior. However, a major concern of
strict liability-ignored by defendants-is the conclusion that if a product was
in fact defective, the distributor of the product should compensate its victims
for the misfortune that it inflicted on them.
Id. The court then discussed the manner in which disallowing the state-of-the-art defense
would advance the policies underlying strict product liability, including compensation,
risk spreading, deterrence, and efficiency of the factfinding process. See id. at 205-08, 447
A.2d at 547-49.
In 1984, the New Jersey Supreme Court opined, in dicta, that Beshada was limited to
its specific circumstances, presumably asbestos product litigation. See Feldman v. Led-
erle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 454-55, 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (1984). Feldman was a drug
product liability action in which the court allowed the state-of-the-art defense notwith-
standing its decision in Beshada two years earlier. In 1987, in Fischer v. Johns-Manville
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tions have allowed the state-of-the-art defense in this context.' 8 2 This
defense is particularly germane to failure-to-warn actions brought on la-
tent-disease claims in which the state of scientific knowledge regarding
the toxicity of the relevant substance at the time of the worker's exposure
may have been minimal compared to the state of knowledge at the time
the action was commenced.
Third-party product liability actions may be available to victims of
toxic reproductive and genetic workplace injuries when the toxic sub-
stance was conveyed to the victim's employer from a third party for use
in the employer's manufacturing business or other enterprise. 183 Such
third-party actions may be unavailable to employees of chemical compa-
nies, however, if their employers actually manufactured or otherwise cre-
ated the toxic substance in the course of business, because of the
operation of the workers' compensation exclusivity doctrine. This dis-
parity may prove inequitable. While employees of companies that
merely use a toxin in their production would be able to bring a tort ac-
tion against the manufacturer of the toxin, employees of the manufac-
turer would be limited to workers' compensation due to the mere fortuity
of their employer's status as manufacturer.18 4
Corp., 103 N.J. 643, 653-54, 512 A.2d 466, 471-72 (1986), the New Jersey Supreme Court
declined to apply the direct holding of Feldman to an asbestos case. The court's holding
in Fischer may have been influenced, however, by the fact that evidence existed that the
defendants could have known as early as the 1930s of the dangers of asbestos exposure.
See id. at 649-50, 512 A.2d at 469. In any event, New Jersey appears to continue to
disallow the state-of-the-art defense in asbestos product liability actions, while allowing it
in other product liability cases. Indeed, the Third Circuit held, in In re Asbestos Litiga-
tion, 829 F.2d 1233, 1244 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988), that New
Jersey did not unconstitutionally discriminate between classes of product liability defend-
ants in refusing to allow the state-of-the-art defense in asbestos cases.
182. See, e.g., Fell v. Kewanee Farm Equip. Co., 457 N.W.2d 911, 920 (Iowa 1990)
(stating that "the state-of-the-art defense is a complete defense"); Anderson v. Owens-
Coming Fiberglas Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 991, 810 P.2d 549, 50, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528, 529
(1991) (ruling that state-of-the-art defense may be relevant to issue of knowability in a
product liability action). In Anderson, the court, ruling on the availability of the defense
in the context of a failure-to-warn action, expressly rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the state-of-the-art defense imposes an inappropriate negligence standard on strict liabil-
ity principles. According to the court, "a manufacturing or design defect can be evalu-
ated without reference to the conduct of the manufacturer, [but] the giving of a warning
cannot." Id. at 1002, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537 (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original).
183. Asbestos product liability actions have become the new classic examples of such
third-party actions in the area of toxic workplace exposures. Typically, such actions have
been brought by asbestos insulation workers against the manufacturers of the asbestos
products they installed during the course of their employment for contractors. See, e.g.,
Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158 (8th Cir. 1975) (suit by asbes-
tos insulation worker against manufacturer of asbestos insulation); Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081-86 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869
(1974) (same).
184. It is unlikely that such employees would be successful in arguing that the em-
ployer's status as manufacturer would place the employer in a dual capacity outside the
scope of workers' compensation because the duty owed by the employer to its employees
may be distinct from the employer's duty to the general public. Nevertheless, plaintiffs'
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The inequity in the availability of third-party product liability suits is
compounded by the fact that virtually all jurisdictions grant the em-
ployer a statutory lien against any recovery obtained by the worker from
the third party."'5 Thus, negligent employers could conceivably avoid
liability altogether: the exclusivity doctrine would bar a direct tort ac-
tion, and the employer would be entitled to reimbursement for any work-
ers' compensation benefits paid to the injured employee.'8 6 Although
there have been some innovative attempts to rectify these inequitable re-
sults by permitting manufacturers to seek contribution from the negli-
gent employer,187 most jurisdictions still shield employers from any
obligation to contribute to the overall damages obtained by the worker in
the third-party action.188
2. Actions by Related Third Parties Against Employers
Toxic reproductive and genetic injuries do not only harm the employee
but, due to their insidious nature, may affect persons beyond the exposed
worker. Thus, spouses and offspring may have claims for damages aris-
ing out of the worker's exposure to toxins. Like employees, third parties
may encounter difficulties in the tort system in recovering for these inju-
ries. Particularly with respect to damaged embryos and fetuses, the legal
system is struggling to determine an appropriate remedial framework in
which to fit such unconventional claims.
a. Claims by Spouses
Claims by spouses arising out of the workers' occupational exposure
fall into two categories. The first is the derivative variety, exemplified by
suits for loss of consortium. The second involves suits for spouses' direct
personal injuries. This distinction is fundamental in establishing the
availability of a direct tort action for the spouse against the employer.
Even when a cause of action is available, however, the claim may fail.
attorneys should investigate the availability and scope of the dual capacity exception in
the relevant jurisdiction. For a general discussion of the dual capacity exception to the
exclusivity of workers' compensation, see supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
185. See Weiler, Workers' Compensation and Product Liability: The Interaction of a
Tort and a Non-Tort Regime, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 825, 836 (1989).
186. See id at 837, 840-41.
187. The most dramatic example of judicial manipulation in this manner was effected
by the New York Court of Appeals two decades ago. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30
N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). In Dole, the third-party product
manufacturer impleaded the plaintiff's decedent's employer. The court allowed the im-
pleader and established a doctrine that required apportionment of the damages awarded
to the plaintiff between the manufacturer and the employer. See id. at 148-49, 282
N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. Such reform efforts have their inequitable aspects as
well. The employer in Dole was required to pay its proportionate share of the plaintiff's
tort damages only through the fortuitous circumstance that a third-party manufacturer
was available for the plaintiff to sue. Had no third party been available, the employer
would have been shielded, and payments would have been limited to the extent of work-
ers' compensation benefits.
188. See 2B A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 76.20, at 14-654 (1989).
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Loss-of-consortium claims typically are barred by the workers' com-
pensation exclusivity doctrine. States with compensation statutes that
define "exclusive liability" in terms of the employer's liability gener-
ally,' 89 or that list spouses or other parties as within the scope of the
covered injury, 190 generally prohibit independent loss-of-consortium
suits. 191
In contrast, when spouses suffer independent injuries arising from the
breach of an independent duty owed to the spouse by the employer, the
exclusivity doctrine may be circumvented.' 92 To bring a personal injury
action, however, a spouse must distinguish between the original injury to
the worker and the independent injury to the spouse. This task may
prove difficult and may result in arbitrary judicial distinctions.
An early example of an independent-injury case is Price v. Yellow Pine
Paper Mill.'93 In this case, an employer was found liable after bringing a
seriously injured employee home to his pregnant wife, causing her such
severe shock that she suffered a miscarriage.' 94 A more contemporary
scenario, however, might involve a male worker who suffers an occupa-
tional reproductive or genetic injury that ultimately causes his wife to
suffer a spontaneous abortion.' 95 While in the former situation the em-
ployer clearly breached a separate and independent duty to the spouse
after the injury to the worker had occurred, in the latter scenario the line
between the worker's injury and the spouse's injury is blurred. An em-
ployer could reasonably argue that the spouse's injury was so inextrica-
bly merged with the worker's initial injury that in fact the spontaneous
abortion was part and parcel of the initial injury, thus falling within the
coverage of the relevant workers' compensation statute.196 Such a result,
however, would be inequitable, as it is unlikely that a male worker's
claim for his wife's miscarriage would be compensated under most work-
ers' compensation schemes. Apart from the obvious causation problems,
by denying the spouse an independent tort action, the current scheme
189. See Cal. Lab. Code § 3601 (West 1989); Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 85, § 12 (West
1970); W. Va. Code § 23-2-6 (1985 & West Supp. 1991).
190. See Iowa Code Ann. § 85.20 (West 1984); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 176.061 (West 1966
& Supp. 1992); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 287.120 (Vernon 1965 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. Work.
Comp. Law § 11 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1992); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-210 (1991);
Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-13 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
191. See 2A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 66.20, at 12-71-92
(1990 & Supp. Nov. 1991) (cataloging cases denying loss-of-consortium actions).
192. See id. § 66.30, at 12-92-94.
193. Price v. Yellow Pine Paper Mill Co., 240 S.W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
194. See id. at 589.
195. See Baker, Metal Firm to Pay for Lead Tests, L.A. Times, July 11, 1991, at BI,
col. 5 (workers at metal recycling company exposed to lead at work suffered
miscarriages).
196. This argument is analogous to the ruling of the California appellate court in Bell
v. Macy's Cal., 212 Cal. App. 3d 1442, 1451, 261 Cal. Rptr. 447, 453 (1989). In Bell, the
court held that prenatal injuries to the offspring of an employee were covered by the
workers' compensation system, thus barring the offspring's independent action against
the parent's employer. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
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forecloses the couple from seeking relief for the spouse's injury under
either the compensation or tort systems.
One federal appellate case may shed some light on future judicial anal-
ysis of this problem. In Woerth v. United States,197 the spouse of a fed-
eral employee contracted hepatitis from the employee. The employee, a
nurse at a Veteran's Administration hospital, had contracted the disease
in the course of her employment. When the spouse commenced an ac-
tion against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 198 the government argued that the action was barred by the exclu-
sivity provision of the Federal Employee's Compensation Act' 99
("FECA"), a federal scheme analogous to state workers' compensation
statutes.20° The district court concluded that the FECA exclusivity pro-
vision barred the spouse's action because the employee was subject to the
FECA provisions.2 "1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,
distinguishing the independent injury suffered by Mr. Woerth from the
loss-of-consortium claims that typically would be barred by the FECA
exclusivity provision. 2 The court stated:
The proper inquiry. .. is whether the claim is 'with respect to the
injury or death of an employee.' While Woerth's hepatitis may derive
from his wife as a matter of proximate cause, his cause of action does
not. His right to recover for the negligence of the United States is
based upon his own personal injury, not a right of 'husband and wife.'
The fact that the disease was transmitted through his spouse does not
place Woerth in a position different from that of any other unrelated,
but similarly injured tort victim. 2 0 3
Accordingly, the court readily recognized that the spouse could maintain
this action for personal injuries regardless of the fact that his immediate
exposure was through the employee who was covered by FECA. This
simple approach opts to draw the exclusivity line along the traditional
boundary between derivative claims and individual claims rather than
construct a more complicated distinction related to proximate cause.
Such an approach clearly would support the independent claims of work-
ers' spouses in toxic reproductive and genetic injury cases. Indeed, with-
out this approach, spouses in these cases might be precluded from any
recovery.
b. Claims by or on Behalf of Offspring
Offspring also may suffer a variety of injuries from their parents' expo-
197. Woerth v. United States, 714 F.2d 648, 649 (6th Cir. 1983).
198. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988).
199. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1988).
200. See Woerth, 714 F.2d at 649.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 650.
203. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1988)).
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sure to workplace toxins. Like spouses, offspring bringing tort actions
for prenatal injuries against a parent's employer must make the threshold
showing of an independent injury.
A few jurisdictions have limited the offspring to the parent's workers'
compensation benefits. 2" In Bell v. Macy's California,2 °5 for example,
the injuries to a pregnant worker's fetus resulting in the death of the
offspring at approximately two years of age were deemed to be covered
by the California workers' compensation statute. The court, after declar-
ing the underlying precept that "the fetus in utero is inseparable from its
mother,"20 6 held that the injury to the offspring "was derived from the
compensable injury" to the worker and, therefore, was collateral to the
covered injury.2 "7 Although the injuries to the offspring were covered
under workers' compensation, the relevant statute failed to provide any
actual compensation for the child's medical and other expenses.20 '
While most jurisdictions allow offspring of exposed workers to bring
independent personal injury actions against their parents' employers, the
conceptual and practical complexities of allowing such actions have pre-
204. See Bell v. Macy's Cal., 212 Cal. App. 3d 1442, 1451, 261 Cal. Rptr. 447, 453
(1989); State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Porter, 103 Nev. 170, 171, 734 P.2d 729, 729-30 (1987).
But see Adams v. Denny's Inc., 464 So. 2d 876, 877-78 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Dillon v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 35 Mich. App. 603, 603, 192 N.W.2d 661, 661 (1971); Witty v. American
Gen. Capital Distribs., 697 S.W.2d 636, 638-39 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 727 S.W.2d 503, 504-05 ('ex. 1987).
205. Bell v. Macy's Cal., 212 Cal. App. 3d 1442, 1451, 261 Cal. Rptr. 447, 453 (1989).
206. Id. at 1453 n.6, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 454 n.6.
207. Id. at 1451, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 453. The court explained:
Our conclusion ... is founded on the perception that the employer, having
given up all common law defenses and undertaken a form of strict liability to
employees, should not be held liable in tort for certain collateral consequences
of a covered injury .... Moreover, were the fetus of a pregnant worker to
retain a separate tort cause of action for injury to it, the employer would face a
serious risk.... The range of common workplace injury that could result in
injury or death to a fetus needs little exposition. Trips and falls, car accidents,
explosions, fires, and other unfortunate but not unheard-of incidents of employ-
ment all may cause serious injury or death to the unborn as well as its parent.
Less obvious are cases of subtle poisoning by exposure to toxic substances, ge-
netic damage caused by radiation, and the other numerous and cautionary by-
products of the Industrial Revolution.
Id. at 1453-54, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 455. The court then explored the rule permitting an
action by the offspring, which could lead to the unacceptable result that employers would
exclude women from the workplace to avoid the liability from such accidents and expo-
sures. See id. This issue was addressed in United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1209-10 (1991), in which the Supreme Court held that employee
protection policies implemented by employers to exclude women from the hazards of
particular jobs are in violation of Title VII.
208. See Bell, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 1454-55, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 455-56. The court in Bell
stated that any mitigation of this harsh result would be appropriate for legislative enact-
ment, rather than judicial opinion. See id. at 1454-1455, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 455. Cf State
Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Porter, 103 Nev. 170, 171, 734 P.2d 729, 729 (Nev. 1987) (holding that
prenatal injury was covered under workers' compensation, and mother permitted to re-
cover as compensation benefits medical expenses directly related to neonatal care of pre-
mature offspring).
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occupied courts for several decades. Generally, all jurisdictions allow
children to pursue an action for prenatal injuries if they are born alive.
Similarly, parents usually are allowed to bring wrongful death actions to
recover for employer conduct that caused a stillbirth." 9 Most jurisdic-
tions at least purport to require that the fetus be viable 10 at the time of
the injury in utero.21
209. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R_ Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Torts
§ 55, at 368-69 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton on Torts].
210. "Viability" has been defined as "[c]apability of living;... [and] usually connotes a
fetus that has reached 500g in weight and 20 gestational weeks." Stedman's Medical
Dictionary 1556 (24th ed. 1982). Legal definitions of viability may incorporate other
factors as well. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973), for example, the United States
Supreme Court stated that medical opinion indicated that viability usually is determined
to be approximately 28 gestational weeks, but could be as early as 24 gestational weeks.
Cf. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989) (rejecting viability
as delineating the point at which state could constitutionally regulate abortion) (citing
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 795
(1986) (White, J., dissenting)); id. at 528 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Webster, the
Court upheld the Missouri state statute that prohibited nontherapeutic abortions after
viability. See id. at 519-20. The statute provides that
[b]efore a physician performs an abortion on a woman he has reason to believe
is carrying an unborn child of twenty or more weeks gestational age, the physi-
cian shall first determine if the unborn child is viable by using and exercising
that degree of care, skill, and proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinarily
skillful, careful, and prudent physician engaged in similar practice under the
same or similar conditions.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.029 (West Supp. 1992). The statute notes that compliance with this
provision could require that the physician perform various medical examinations relating
to gestational age, fetal weight, and lung maturity. See id. The Webster Court rejected
an interpretation requiring such medical examinations in all circumstances, finding that
in at least some circumstances the "reasonable professional skill and judgment" of the
physician in determining viability could be exercised without such testing. Webster, 492
U.S. at 515 (plurality opinion). In essence, the Missouri statute creates a "presumption of
viability at 20 weeks, which the physician must rebut with tests indicating that the fetus is
not viable prior to performing an abortion." Id. Thus, the various legal definitions of
viability are at best mutable. Efforts to hinge tort liability on fetal viability would merely
add another ambiguous dimension to an already slippery concept.
211. This rule may have been perpetuated because most cases in which offspring have
recovered for prenatal injuries have in fact involved post-viability injuries. See Prosser &
Keeton on Torts, supra note 209, § 55, at 368. Courts, however, do not always strictly
enforce the viability rule. See e.g., Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 484-85, 147 A.2d
108, 110 (1958) (infant can maintain an action for prenatal injury occuring prior to viabil-
ity); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 367, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960) (recovery not neces-
sarily denied if prenatal injury occurred before viability); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267,
273, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960) (notion that child must have been viable when injuries were
received has little to do with the basic right to recover); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 RI. 76,
79, 220 A.2d 222, 224 (1966) (employing causation not viability as test); Robertson, To-
ward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries
Preconception Injuries, & Wrongful Life, 1978 Duke L.J. 1401, 1412 (illogic and injustice
of viability rule led most courts to abandon the rule and require only a causal connection
between injury and damages). Viability as the basis for the existence of a cause of action
for prenatal injury apparently had its basis in the concern that the existence of the fetus
be verifiable at the time of the injury. Because nearly all jurisdictions allow offspring, and
not fetuses, to sue for prenatal injuries, the existence of the fetus at the time of the injury
can be verified by objective medical criteria.
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Jarvis v. Providence Hospital2 1 2 demonstrates one court's attempt to
deal with the strictures of the viability requirement. In this case, a father
was permitted to maintain a wrongful death suit for a stillborn child who
was exposed to the hepatitis virus prior to viability, but who suffered fatal
injury after viability. The child's mother, a medical technician in the
defendant hospital's laboratory, was exposed to the virus in the work-
place when she was three and one-half months pregnant. The mother
was diagnosed with hepatitis when she was eight months pregnant, and
approximately one week later her child was stillborn.21a In allowing the
wrongful death action, the court found that although the plaintiff's dece-
dent was not born alive, the fetus had been viable at the time of injury.2 14
The court refused to extend the viability requirement to the time of the
negligence, however, concluding that the stage of fetal development at
which the negligent conduct occurred was irrelevant.
215
Jarvis presented a situation in which the precise time of both exposure
and injury was easily calculable. The timing of most toxic reproductive
and genetic injuries, however, is far less precise. Exposures may create
acute conditions or may be cumulative. Moreover, injury to the embryo
or fetus could be immediate or may require a latency period of days,
weeks, or even months before the injury is manifested. Even with cur-
rent medical developments in prenatal diagnostics, 216 precise information
regarding time of exposure and injury may be impossible to ascertain. A
worker unaware of a hazardous exposure may have no reason to seek
medical attention for the possibility of fetal harm if no other objective
medical indicia of injury are presented during gestation. This problem
may be particularly characteristic of certain genetic injuries.
The viability requirement is an imprecise and unfair bar to recovery
for offspring of exposed workers. Time of viability is imprecise and sub-
212. Jarvis v. Providence Hosp., 178 Mich. App. 586, 444 N.W.2d 236 (1989).
213. See id. at 589, 444 N.W.2d at 237.
214. See id. at 591, 444 N.W.2d at 238. The common law of Michigan required that
for an action based upon prenatal injuries to be allowable, the offspring must have been
born alive or the fetus must have been viable at the time of the injury. See id. For a
historical analysis of the live-birth requirement, see Robertson, supra note 211, at 1420-
34. See also Note, Recovery for the Wrongful Death of a Fetus, 25 U. Rich. L. Rev. 391,
394-96 (1991) (discussing live birth and viability as criteria in actions for wrongful death
of a fetus).
215. See Jarvis, 178 Mich. App. at 593, 444 N.W.2d at 239. The court compared the
Jarvis case to an earlier case in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that a common-
law negligence action for prenatal injury was permissible if brought by an afterborn child
for injuries incurred in utero at a gestational age of four months. See id. at 591-92, 444
N.W.2d at 238-39; see also Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d 218,
222 (1971) (assuming fetus was nonviable at the time of the injury); O'Neill v. Morse, 385
Mich. 130, 133-34, 188 N.W.2d 785, 785-86 (1971) (extending Womack to allow wrong-
ful death claim by viable fetus injured in utero at eight months gestational age). The
Jarvis court concluded that both Womack and O'Neill warranted an extension of liability
to stillborn fetuses "regardless of the stage of fetal development in which the negligence
occurred." Jarvis, 178 Mich. App. at 593, 444 N.W.2d at 239.
216. See generally G. Kolata, The Baby Doctors-Probing the Limits of Fetal
Medicine (1990) (discussing medical and ethical issues in fetal diagnostics and therapy).
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ject to conflicting medical and legal interpretations." ' In addition, be-
cause some substances in the workplace can be toxic to the embryo,
either before implantation or during the post-implantation embryonic
phase, viability as a criterion would preclude recovery for such early
pregnancy injuries, as well as for fetal injuries prior to viability. 218 The
availability of a cause of action would be dependent purely upon the arbi-
trary element of gestational age, rather than on notions of legal duty and
causation. The injury to resulting offspring could be identical, regardless
of gestational age at the time of exposure. Concern for the possibility of
nonmeritorious actions is more appropriately addressed within the con-
text of the principles of duty and causation rather than according to ar-
cane concepts of viability and verifiable personhood2 ? Thus, while it
may be more difficult for a plaintiff to prove the requisite causation when
the injury occurs during preimplantation or prior to viability, the plain-
tiff, nevertheless, should be afforded the opportunity to present proof for
the factfinder to determine.
Moreover, infusing the concept of fetal viability into tort principles
makes tort law vulnerable to the political fervor of the abortion de-
bate.220 Although fetuses traditionally have not been granted legal rights
independent from their mothers,"2 current judicial interest in "fetal
rights" eventually may give rise to an altered legal status for all fe-
217. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
218. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 350-53, 367 N.F-2d 1250, 1252-
53 (1977) (rejecting viability as criterion for common-law action for prenatal injuries).
The Renslow court observed that "denial of claims for injuries to the previable fetus may
indeed cut off some of the most meritorious claims, for there is substantial medical au-
thority that congenital structural defects caused by factors in the prenatal environment
can be sustained only early in the previable stages." Id. at 352-353, 367 NE.2d at 1252-
53.
219. This focus avoids some of the possible confusion between the treatment of fetuses
for the purpose of the tort law and their status within the context of the abortion debate.
220. Indeed, the court in Jarvis acknowledged an apparent conflict between the Michi-
gan cases imposing a duty of care upon defendants for conduct toward a nonviable fetus
and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1976), in which the United States Supreme Court per-
mitted a pregnant woman the right to choose to abort her fetus during the first two
trimesters of pregnancy. The Michigan court reasoned:
[A]s Roe was balancing only the rights of the mother against the right of the
state to protect a "potential human being," Roe did not determine whether a
state might protect the "potential human being" from conduct of a third party
which foreseeably endangers the life of a fetus, whether or not the fetus is via-
ble. We conclude that such protection has been afforded in Michigan under the
common law ... and that such protection is not inconsistent with the mother's
right of privacy preserved by Roe.
Jarvis, 178 Mich. App. at 596-97, 444 N.W.2d at 240-41. In contrast to Roe, the
Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 516 (1989),
stated in dicta that states may have a legitimate interest in protecting the developing fetus
by regulating abortion from the moment of conception. These issues raise a significant
question as to what relation such distinctions made within the context of abortion regula-
tion should bear to tort liability.
221. See Goldberg, Of Gametes and Guardianr The Impropriety of Appointing Guardi-
ans Ad Litem for Fetuses and Embryos, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 503, 516-17 (1991).
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tuses.2 22 The availability of a remedy to children born damaged as a
result of a parent's toxic workplace exposure should not depend upon the
vicissitudes of viability. Such actions should appropriately be loss-ori-
ented rather than dependent upon the legal status of the developing em-
bryo2 23 or fetus. Concurring with the loss-oriented approach, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court has rejected the viability standard, focusing in-
stead on proof of causation to determine the existence of legally cogniza-
ble prenatal injuries.224
Some plaintiffs have advanced other theories of recovery for prenatal
injuries, such as "wrongful life." Plaintiffs bringing these claims assert
that they never should have been born because the harmful results of the
defendants' conduct toward them prior to birth rendered their lives not
worth living.22 Courts are averse to such wrongful life claims on public
policy grounds, however, because of the invited comparison between
existence and nonexistence.226
c. Preconception and Intergenerational Torts
Offspring of exposed workers may also seek remedy through precon-
ception torts, alleging that injuries were caused by damage to the sperm
or egg prior to fertilization.227 While only a small minority of courts
recognize these kinds of actions,228 no clear theoretical reason exists to
distinguish between such torts and post-conception prenatal torts. 29
Public policy, however, may favor a new approach.
While injury to the egg or sperm arguably is peculiar to the adult male
or female because a developing third person does not exist even in the
most rudimentary embryonic or fetal form, logic dictates that an in-
222. For a discussion of the potential conflicts between women's rights and the expan-
sion of fetal rights, see Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts With Women's Con-
stitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 Yale L.J. 599, 602-25
(1986).
223. Much has been written by both medical and legal commentators concerning the
legal status of the human embryo, particularly as to whether the law should recognize a
distinction between preimplantation embryos and postimplantation embryos. For a dis-
cussion of the various views of the legal status of the embryo, see Eggen, The "Orwellian
Nightmare" Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Repro-
ductive Technologies, 25 Ga. L. Rev. 625, 657-64 (1991).
224. See Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 187-89, 365 A.2d 748, 753-54 (1976);
Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 79, 220 A.2d 222, 224 (1966).
225. See Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra note 209, § 55, at 370-71.
226. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 25, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967), overruled on
other grounds by Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). More judicial lenience
has been shown, however, in analogous actions brought by parents for "wrongful birth,"
and recovery often is allowed on that theory for the parents' economic losses and emo-
tional distress. See generally Robertson, supra note 211, at 1439-55 (discussing wrongful
conception, failed contraconception, and denied abortion as causes of action).
227. Cf. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, 483 F.2d 237, 238-39 (10th Cir.
1973) (genetic injury resulting from mother's ingestion of drug).
228. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 10 I11. Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d
1250 (1977); Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra note 209, § 55, at 369 & n.26.
229. See Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra note 209, § 55, at 369.
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dependent duty of the employer to protect foreseeable offspring of its
workers should permit a preconception cause of action. This theory
formed the basis of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to allow a claim
for a preconception tort in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital." The plain-
tiff in Renslow, suing on behalf of herself and her minor daughter,
claimed that a condition resulting from incompatible Rh-positive blood
transfusions that she received in 1965 caused the injuries suffered by her
daughter, who was born in 1974.231 The court upheld the existence of a
cause of action, ruling that although the negligent conduct of the defend-
ants occurred many years prior to the child's conception, the impact of
the conduct on the plaintiff's offspring was foreseeable." 23
Phrasing its analysis in terms of duty, the court stated:
In the case at bar, the wrongful conduct took place prior to plaintiff's
conception; the plaintiff at the time of the conduct was in no sense a
separate entity to whom the traditional duty of care could be owed.
Plaintiff herein asks us to reexamine our notions of duty, and to find, in
essence, a contingent prospective duty to a child not yet conceived but
foreseeably harmed by a breach of duty to the child's mother."3
Thus, the court held that the defendant could be held liable because
"there is a right to be born free from prenatal injuries foreseeably caused
by a breach of duty to the child's mother," regardless of the time of
conception. 2 4
Earlier, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had
reached a similar conclusion through an analysis of causation rather than
duty. In Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, 5 the court upheld a
cause of action by the father of twins, one deceased and one living, born
with genetic defects allegedly caused by the mother's ingestion of the
defendant's birth-control pills prior to the twins' conception. The court
allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of causation on the theory that
the birth control pills had altered the mother's own chromosome struc-
ture, thereby inducing the genetic defect in the offspring." 6
Whether the right of action is couched in terms of duty or causation,
actual proof of causation for preconception torts may be especially prob-
lematic given the current stage of scientific knowledge regarding repro-
ductive and genetic injuries. Although relief for plaintiffs claiming
preconception torts may be illusory in many circumstances, the specter
of employer liability may spark further scientific research in this impor-
tant area.
230. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 357-59, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255-
56 (1977).
231. See id. at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
232. See id. at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
233. Id. at 355-356, 367 N.E.2d at 1254.
234. Id. at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
235. Jorgenson v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
236. See id. at 239.
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In Renslow, the Illinois court acknowledged the potential for a Pan-
dora's box of "self-perpetuating" claims by subsequent generations for
genetic damage, but it distinguished the case at hand as presenting a fi-
nite injury.2 37 At least one state high court, however, has rejected a
cause of action for a finite preconception tort based upon the potential
for limitless actions.
In Enright v. Eli Lilly and Co.,238 the plaintiff's grandmother ingested
the drug DES, presumably to prevent a miscarriage while she was preg-
nant with the plaintiff's mother. The plaintiff claimed that her mother's
exposure to the DES in utero resulted in the mother's inability to carry
her own baby to term, leading to the plaintiff's premature birth and re-
lated injuries.23 9 On intermediate appeal, the appellate division2 40 held
that although prior New York case law24" ' foreclosed the plaintiff's negli-
gence claim against the DES manufacturer, the plaintiff could pursue her
strict liability claim.242 The appellate division justified this conclusion by
citing New York's strong public policy favoring the fashioning of a rem-
edy for DES injuries.243
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division, con-
cluding that more urgent policies overrode the state's interest in provid-
ing a remedy for persons injured by DES.244 The court stated that the
nature of the plaintiff's preconception injuries presented "vexing ques-
tions with. . . 'staggering implications.'... For all we know, the rippling
effects of DES exposure may extend for generations. It is our duty to
confine liability within manageable limits. Limiting liability to those who
ingested the drug or were exposed to it in utero serves this purpose. "245
Genetic injuries present the exact problems foreseen, but not directly
ruled on, by the New York Court of Appeals in Enright. The number of
genetically impaired plaintiffs arising from a single toxic tort is poten-
tially limitless. Additionally, the severity of the injuries may be com-
pletely unknown and unpredictable at the time of the defendant's
activities. These factors render the defendant incapable of developing an
appropriate risk-management strategy. Defendants would be unable to
accurately predict the magnitude of the risks their conduct creates, nor
would they be likely to survive the financial onslaught of the generations
237. See Renslow, 67 Ill. 2d at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
238. Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377, 570 N.E.2d 198, 568 N.Y.S.2d 550
(1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 197 (1991).
239. See Enright, 77 N.Y.2d at 380, 570 N.E.2d at 199, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
240. See Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 155 A.D.2d 64, 553 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1990), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 197 (1991).
241. The court relied on Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786,
445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981).
242. See Enright, 155 A.D.2d at 70, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
243. See id. at 68-69, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97.
244. See Enright, 77 N.Y.2d at 386-89, 570 N.E.2d at 203-04, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 555-56.
245. Id. at 386-87, 570 N.E.2d at 203, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 555 (quoting Albala v. City of
New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 273, 429 N.E.2d 786, 788, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (1981)).
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of lawsuits arising out of that conduct.2 As a result, the deterrent effect
of the tort-law system would be diluted. Enright responds directly to this
threat, and it is probable that other states faced with this issue will rule
likewise.
Enright reflected a pure policy decision. The judiciary engaged in arbi-
trary line-drawing for the purpose of restricting future liability and plac-
ing a limit on litigation. While there is nothing new in this approach-
statutes of limitations have been enacted for precisely this reason-En-
right illustrates New York's ambivalence toward toxic-injury litigation.
In 1986, the New York state legislature enacted a discovery statute of
limitations applicable to all cases arising from exposure to toxic sub-
stances.2 4 7 In Enright, the state's high court is now saying that only a
limited class of persons may take advantage of the tort system to redress
those same toxic injuries.
The New York example demonstrates the utter ambivalence and
equivocation with which states have approached the legal issues
presented by toxic injuries and the mixed messages sent to injured per-
sons and potential defendants alike. Most notably, even where precon-
ception torts are recognized, as in Renslow, it is likely that the genetically
injured will remain out in the cold. The absence of accountability for
such injuries assures not only a lack of deterrence, but also a dearth of
incentives for employers to monitor the workplace for potential hazards.
If employers know that they will not be held liable for genetic injuries to
persons who were not directly exposed-in utero or otherwise-to toxic
substances in their workplaces, they will have a powerful incentive to
ignore genetic risks. Whether or not the states choose to recognize
causes of action for successive generations of genetically injured, the sys-
tem must at least address these secondary issues in a meaningful fashion.
III. TOWARD A NEW JURISPRUDENCE OF Toxic LIABILITY
Toxic reproductive and genetic injuries in the workplace challenge the
presumptions of the tort and workers' compensation systems in a manner
not seen since the Industrial Revolution. Problems arising from addi-
246. Several of the dissenters in Renslow were particularly concerned about these is-
sues. The Chief Justice was concerned as to "how to measure the insurance risk and the
possible exposure of a defendant to claims by successive generations of plaintiffs who
complain of genetic injury." 67 Ill. 2d at 371, 367 N.E.2d at 1261 (Ward, CJ., dissent-
ing). Another dissenting justice opined:
Considering the likelihood of suits filed decades after the alleged negligence oc-
curred, the difficulty of proving or defending against such claims, the impossi-
bility of actuarial measurement of the risks involved, successive recoveries by
unborn abnormal generations affected by genetic changes .... I believe this
departure from our rule denying recovery for preconception injuries is both un-
necessary and undesirable.
Id. at 372, 367 N.E.2d at 1262 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
247. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214-c (McKinney 1990).
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tional related parties, intervening causes, sequential injuries, 248 and a
dearth of scientific knowledge relevant to causation may appear singly or
in combination in such claims. The law has yet to satisfactorily and co-
hesively address these concerns. The current operation of the tort and
workers' compensation systems has failed in this context. Before these
problems can be resolved, the underlying precepts of the tort and work-
ers' compensation systems must be re-evaluated, and any non-function-
ing myths must be abandoned.
A. Re-evaluating the Parameters of Liability
1. The Cause-In-Fact Problem
Causation, as interpreted under both the workers' compensation and
tort regimes, traditionally consists of the dual requirements of cause-in-
fact and proximate cause. The former requirement has been viewed as
factual, while the latter is dependent upon policy determinations as to
whether the law should recognize a particular cause for the purpose of
assigning liability.2 49 The requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that
the defendant's product or conduct was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's
injury-as defined by the traditional but-for test-is a fundamental
threshold principle of the liability system.25 Placing the burden upon
the plaintiff to show cause-in-fact through the introduction of particular-
ized evidence is deemed to serve both the utilitarian and moral goals of
the system.2 51
Some commentators maintain that the concept of cause-in-fact has be-
come infused with policy notions, thus blurring the traditional distinc-
tion between cause-in-fact and proximate cause.25 2 Accordingly, they
argue that because the cause-in-fact requirement has shed its original
rigid and mechanistic nature, courts should employ greater flexibility in
interpreting the requirements of causation. If all aspects of causation
were policy choices, considerable elasticity would be available in the judi-
cial process to carve out a doctrine of causation for new and previously
uncontemplated types of cases.
Indeed, toxic-exposure cases may be viewed less as an aberration and
248. For example, a worker may learn early on of a diagnosis of infertility that is
traceable to an exposure in the workplace. Some time later, the worker may suffer a
spontaneous abortion related to the same exposure. Finally, if the worker eventually
becomes pregnant and carries a fetus to term, the possibility of birth defects or the expres-
sion of genetic damage to the worker could arise.
249. See Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 60 (1956).
250. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 72 (1975).
251. Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vi-
sion of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 858 (1984).
252. See Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indetermi-
nate Plaintiffs, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 881, 891-92 (1982); Firak, The Developing Policy Charac-
teristics of Cause-In-Fact: Alternative Forms of Liability, Epidemiological Proof and
Trans-Scientific Issues, 63 Temp. L. Rev. 311, 312-13 (1990).
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more as an extension of the traditional accident case upon which the
system was founded. Professor David Rosenberg has argued:
[T]he entire notion that "particularistic" evidence differs in some sig-
nificant qualitative way from statistical evidence must be questioned.
The concept of "particularistic" evidence suggests that there exists a
form of proof that can provide direct and actual knowledge of the
causal relationship between the defendant's tortious conduct and the
plaintiff's injury. "Particularistic" evidence, however, is in fact no less
probabilistic than is the statistical evidence that courts purport to
shun. All knowledge of past as well as future events is probabilistic.
Inevitably it rests on intuitive or more rigorously acquired impressions
of the frequency with which similar events have occurred in like cir-
cumstances. "Particularistic" evidence offers nothing more than a ba-
sis for conclusions about a perceived balance of probabilities.23
This passage suggests that judicial and scholarly antipathy toward novel
applications of the causation requirements derives more from rote rever-
ence to inveterate concepts rather than from any logical distinction be-
tween forms of proof. What is most apparent, however, is the not-so-
novel notion that policy judgments participate in every stage of the pro-
cess in the most subtle manner.
Causal indeterminacy is a consistent characteristic of reproductive and
genetic injury claims, even where the claimants can demonstrate a gen-
eral, or statistical, probability of causation. Thus, a claimant may have
difficulty proving that the particular workplace exposure was causally
connected to the injury claimed.2" Similarly, the claimant may be un-
able to distinguish workplace exposure as the cause of the injury from the
background occurrence level of the injury 2 "1 or from other multiple con-
tributing causes. 6 Strict adherence to traditional notions of proof of
causation, therefore, would necessitate the dismissal of virtually all such
claims. In contrast, total abrogation of such fundamentals as cause-in-
fact might invite overexposure of defendants to liability for injuries that
may be associated with background risk levels of the disease rather than
with the defendants' enterprises.
While traditionalists might argue that any departure from the estab-
lished boundaries and burdens of liability would frustrate the policy
goals of the tort and workers' compensation systems, courts and scholars
have begun to advocate various means by which the causation problems
253. Rosenberg, supra note 251, at 870 (footnote omitted). Professor Glen 0. Robin-
son expressed the same sentiment: "One of the illusions fostered by traditional tort doc-
trine is that events have determinate causes that can be identified by careful
investigation.... Probably courts recognize these concerns but are reluctant to articulate
them; their opinions still largely reflect the dominant mechanistic and deterministic con-
ceptions of causation." Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious
Risk, 14 J. Legal Stud. 779, 780 (1985).
254. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
1992]
890 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
presented by new toxic injuries can be incorporated into the system. 2 "
These reform-minded views, to one extent or another, embrace the prob-
abilistic nature of toxic-exposure cases and attempt to refashion the sys-
tem to achieve an appropriate balance among the goals of compensation,
deterrence, and loss-spreading.
For example, several states have adopted judicial rules of alternative
liability in actions brought by persons exposed in utero to the drug DES,
where the plaintiff is unable to identify the defendant or defendants who
manufactured the DES ingested by the plaintiff's mother.258 Thus, in
257. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 252, at 892-95 (advocating relaxation of causal rules
to promote tort goals of compensation, loss-spreading, deterrence, economic efficiency,
knowledge, and justice); Firak, supra note 252, at 338-40 (discussing proposing alterna-
tive liability, industry-wide liability, concerted action, market share liability, and risk
contribution liability as alternatives to traditional cause-in-fact liability); Robinson, supra
note 253, at 785-89 (proposing risk-based liability as an alternative); Rosenberg, supra
note 251, at 861-86 (considering whether proportional liability for mass exposure torts
would serve the goals of tort law more effectively than does the preponderance rule).
258. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-12, 607 P.2d 924,
936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-45 (market share liability), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 325-34, 343 N.W.2d 164, 170-74 (1984)
(alternative liability), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73
N.Y.2d 487, 511-13, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 950 (1989) (market share
liability); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 603, 689 P.2d 368, 381
(1984) (market share); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 179, 342 N.W.2d 37, 49-
50 (1984) (risk contribution liability). The various theories developed within the context
of the DES cases arise from more traditionally accepted doctrines. See, e.g., Summers v.
Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948) (alternative liability); Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 876 (1979) (concerted action). Both the alternative liability and concerted
action theories presume that the plaintiff will place before the court all possible defend-
ants who could have performed the acts of which the plaintiff complains. Moreover,
these theories assume that the defendants are, in all cases, better able to determine which
act was the specific cause of the plaintiff's injury. See Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.
166, 179, 342 N.W.2d 37, 45-46 (1984) (rejecting application of alternative liability or
concerted action theories for DES case). In toxic-exposure cases, often neither of these
presumptions applies. The DES situation was particularly problematic because the drug
was produced generically by a fluid market that included as many as 300 manufacturers
during the decades of its production. See id. at 175, 342 N.W.2d at 44. Some of the same
problems occur in other toxic-exposure cases, such as those involving asbestos insulation,
hazardous waste, and AIDS-tainted blood products. In these situations, however, courts
generally have demonstrated a reluctance to apply such innovative theories of liability.
Even in jurisdictions in which market share liability has been applied to DES cases, con-
troversy ensues over whether market share and similar liability theories should extend to
other toxic-exposure cases. Thus, in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 508,
539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 947 (1989), the New York Court of Appeals
expressly limited application of the market share theory adopted therein to DES cases.
In Hall v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the
court applied enterprise liability-a predecessor to market share liability-in a case in-
volving injuries resulting from blasting caps. The court found significant the fact that the
industry engaged in joint safety control by manufacturers. See id. at 371-76. Some recent
decisions have exhibited judicial interest in applying broader concepts of collective liabil-
ity outside the context of DES. See, e.g., Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 147-49
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1987) (ruling that asbestos manufacturer may be liable on theory of fraud-
ulent concealment even if plaintiffs cannot identify manufacturer's products as cause of
injuries); Ray v. Cutter Laboratories, 754 F. Supp. 193, 195-96 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding
that market share theory of liability applied to negligence claims by plaintiffs who alleg-
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Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,25 9 the California Supreme Court permit-
ted the plaintiffs to join as defendants manufacturers comprising a sub-
stantial share of the DES market, holding that each defendant would be
liable for any judgment earned by the plaintiffs in an amount representa-
tive of its proportionate share of the market. Market share liability per-
mits a plaintiff to state a cause of action even where specific cause-in-fact
cannot be demonstrated. In another variation, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,2'6 applied a risk-contribution theory of
collective liability. The court, stating that less than a substantial share of
the DES market could be represented among the defendants, held that a
defendant would be liable for its proportionate share in contributing to
the risk that caused the plaintiff's injury.26' Both Sindell and Collins
shift the burden of addressing cause-in-fact to individual defendants by
requiring each one to come forth with exculpatory evidence.262
Both examples dilute the traditional role of cause-in-fact by rendering
it unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove cause-in-fact in the prima facie
case.26 3 Only upon shifting the burden to the defendants does cause-in-
edly contracted AIDS from blood clotting product derived from thousands of donors).
But see eg., Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1985) (rejecting market
share theory for action brought by asbestos worker because toxicity of various asbestos
products not identical); Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 NJ. 155, 174-77, 561 A.2d
511, 521-22 (1989) (rejecting market share theory for action alleging defective design of
DPT vaccine because such liability would threaten availability of necessary drugs).
259. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 145, cert denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
260. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
261. See id. at 198-99, 342 N.W.2d at 52-53. The court stated that the Wisconsin rules
of comparative negligence would govern the assignment of liability. See id. at 198, 342
N.W.2d at 52-53. The factors to be examined included:
whether the drug company conducted tests on DES for safety and efficacy in
use for pregnancies; to what degree the company took a role in gaining FDA
approval of DES for use in pregnancies; whether the company had a small or
large market share in the relevant area; whether the company took the lead or
merely followed the lead of others in producing or marketing DES; whether the
company issued warnings about the dangers of DES; whether the company pro-
duced or marketed DES after it knew or should have known of the possible
hazards DES presented to the public; and whether the company took any af-
firmative steps to reduce the risk of injury to the public.
Id. at 200, 342 N.W.2d at 53.
262. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145; Collins, 116
Wis. 2d at 197-98, 342 N.W.2d at 52.
263. In Collins, the court set forth the following requirements of a prima facie case:
that the plaintiff's mother took DES; that DES caused the plaintiff's subse-
quent injuries; that the defendant produced or marketed the type of DES taken
by the plaintiff's mother;, and that the defendant's conduct in producing or mar-
keting the DES constituted a breach of a legally recognized duty to the plaintiff.
Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 193, 342 N.W.2d at 50. Thus, the plaintiff need show only that
the defendant marketed the type of DES taken, not that a specific defendant's product
caused the plaintiff's injury. In fact, the court stated that if the plaintiff does not know
the type of DES that allegedly caused the injury, the plaintiff is merely required to plead
that "the defendant drug company produced or marketed the drug DES for use in
preventing miscarriages during pregnancy." Id. at 193-94, 342 N.W.2d at 50.
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fact become an issue. Both theories base liability on risk: Collins turns
risk contribution analysis into a multifactorial case-by-case determina-
tion, whereas Sindell assigns a risk identical to the proportionate eco-
nomic share of the market held by the defendant. Thus, liability may be
imposed even where the named defendant's product or conduct may not
actually have caused the plaintiff's injury.
The most extreme rejection of the cause-in-fact requirement in market
share cases appeared in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co.,2' in which the
New York Court of Appeals refused to allow defendants to exculpate
themselves by proving that they could not have marketed the DES in-
gested by the plaintiffs' mothers. In Hymowitz, therefore, cause-in-fact
played virtually no role: liability could be imposed on a party who indis-
putably could not have caused the specific injury. This result, although
desirable to the New York Court of Appeals on policy grounds, 265 raises
the traditionalists' concerns that abrogation of the cause-in-fact require-
ment leads to inaccurate and ultimately incorrect results.
Similarly, the rise of new actions based upon increased risk of future
disease evinces an interest in risk over cause-in-fact. In Ayers v. Jackson
Township,26 6 the court recognized that a cause of action for enhanced
risk of future disease could lie if a plaintiff could demonstrate a quanti-
fied risk of developing the disease. Presumably, this requirement could
be satisfied by a showing of physical change in the plaintiff's body consis-
tent with the risk of developing subsequent illness. Moreover, this cause
of action would depend upon state rules regarding the accrual of actions
for purposes of the statutory limitations on commencement of actions.
267
A primary objection to increased risk claims of this sort is that the de-
fendant could be required to pay, in an all-or-nothing manner, for an
injury to which the defendant does not actually contribute and which in
fact may never occur.
Increased risk claims have support in a line of cases relating to mis-
diagnosis of illness. In Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative,268 the
negligent conduct of the defendant in failing to timely diagnose the plain-
tiff's cancer caused a reduction in his chances of survival from thirty-
nine percent to twenty-five percent. Holding the defendant liable for the
plaintiff's diminished chance of survival, the court stated:
Causing reduction of the opportunity to recover (loss of chance) by
264. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 512, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078,
541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 950, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
265. See id. at 507-08, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947. The court stated,
"[w]e conclude that the present circumstances call for recognition of a realistic avenue of
relief for plaintiffs injured by DES .... We stress, however, that the DES situation is a
singular case." Id.
266. See Ayers v. Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557, 598-99, 525 A.2d 287, 308 (1987)
(holding no cause of action for an unquantified enhanced risk claim).
267. See Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1231-32 (D. Mass. 1986).
268. See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 612, 664 P.2d 474, 475
(1983).
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one's negligence, however, does not necessitate a total recovery against
the negligent party for all damages caused by the victim's death. Dam-
ages should be awarded to the injured party or his family based only
on damages caused directly by premature death.269
The court thus recognized that under some circumstances it may be ap-
propriate to require the defendant to pay the plaintiff according to the
defendant's proportionate share of risk.
Such lost-chance cases have proven to be premonitory of the propor-
tionate liability theories that scholars have advanced for toxic-exposure
cases. Some commentators have proposed that a defendant should be
required to compensate the plaintiff in an amount no greater than that
defendant's proportionate share in the risk to which the plaintiff was ex-
posed.2 70 Thus, this theory bases liability on probabilities, even where
the probability falls far below the fifty-one percent threshold of the pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard.27 1
Regardless of the relative merits of the various proposals to assist
claimants in proving causation, toxic reproductive and genetic injury
cases clearly present problems that can only be remedied by a non-tradi-
tional view of the causation requirement. The recommendations set
forth in this Article accommodate this need while addressing the policy
goals of the tort and compensation systems.2 72
2. The Attenuation of Duty
In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, the court held that the defendant
owed the plaintiff, an unconceived child at the time the defendant negli-
gently transfused the mother with Rh-incompatible blood, a "contingent
prospective duty" because the harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable at the
269. Id. at 619, 664 P.2d at 479.
270. See eg., Brennan & Carter, Legal and Scientific Probability of Causation of Can-
cer and Other Environmental Disease in Individuals, 10 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 33, 58-
61 (1985) (recommending that legislators adopt a proportionate compensation system
under which a plaintiff would receive the proportion of his damages that equals the per-
cent probability that defendant caused plaintiff's disease); Rosenberg, supra note 251, at
859, 887-924 (comparing the traditional preponderance rule to a "public law" rule of
proportional liability); Comment, Epidemiological Proof of Probability: Implementing
the Proportional Recovery Approach in Toxic Exposure Torts, 89 Dick. L. Rev. 233, 249-
58 (1984) (proposing that an award in a toxic tort case be based on the probability that
defendant caused the injury and that this probability should be proved by the plaintiff).
In a variation on the proportionate liability approach, Professor Farber has proposed the
"most likely victim approach," under which "those plaintiffs whose injuries were least
likely to have been caused by the defendant receive nothing, while those with the highest
causation probabilities get full compensation." Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 Minn. L.
Rev. 1219, 1221 (1987) (footnote omitted).
271. See Firak, supra note 252, at 336-37.
272. For a discussion of the policy goals of the tort and compensation systems in rela-
tion to the problems presented by toxic reproductive and genetic hazards in the work-
place, see infra notes 280-95 and accompanying text.
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time of the defendant's acts.27 3 Duty, the court declared, "is not a static
concept" and is dependent upon foreseeability of injury to a class of
persons.
274
The dissent in Renslow criticized the court's couching of its holding in
terms of duty, accusing the majority of "abandon[ing] the traditional
fault concept of liability premised upon duty and foreseeability and em-
brac[ing] instead a system which depends wholly upon the element of
causation. 2 75 In Renslow, the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries was
clearly traceable to the mother's negligent transfusion. The dissent ob-
jected to what it viewed as the majority's imposition of liability based
purely upon cause-in-fact. Condemning the majority as mindless of the
social policy issues inherent in the concept of duty, the dissent expressed
concern that the majority's rule would ultimately lead to the imposition
of liability where the consequences are unforeseeable, as in genetic injury
cases.
2 76
The situation presented in Renslow is the converse of the probabilistic
causation cases discussed in the preceding section. Many toxic reproduc-
tive and genetic injury cases, however, may contain both cause-in-fact
and duty problems. The most extreme examples of these problems ap-
pear in preconception injury cases and in subsequent-generation genetic
injury cases. In these cases, courts must decide whether sound reasons
exist for extending the defendant's duty beyond certain established rela-
tionships to other foreseeable injuries. Thus, although courts generally
do extend liability to the injury or death of a fetus-at least where the
fetus is viable and often with conditions attached-courts are reluctant to
extend liability to the unconceived.277
On the one hand, extending duty to the outer limits of foreseeability
serves the policy goals of compensation and deterrence. Moreover, ex-
tension of liability to remote victims requires no alteration in the sub-
stance of the relationships at issue. Thus, the defendant who owes the
exposed worker a certain duty arguably would be responsible for all inju-
ries emanating from the worker's exposure.2 78
In contrast, forcing defendants to bear the remote costs of injuries ad
infinitum is inimical to the additional goals of finality and risk allocation.
273. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 357, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (1977);
see also supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text (discussing Renslow).
274. Renslow, 67 Ill. 2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1254.
275. Id. at 372, 367 N.E.2d at 1262 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
276. See id. at 376-377; 367 N.E.2d at 1264 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
277. For a discussion of the current treatment of the claims of injured offspring arising
out of workplace exposures of the parent, see supra notes 204-26 and accompanying text.
278. The situation presented in Renslow differs from the circumstances forming the
basis of the New York Court of Appeals' decision in the classic case of Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 340-41, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928). With reproductive and ge-
netic hazards, the possibility of injury extending to later-conceived fetuses or offspring or
to future generations related biologically to the worker is far more foreseeable than the
possibility that Mrs. Palsgraf would be injured by the series of fortuitous events surround-
ing the explosion of the unmarked package.
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Defendants would be unable to ascertain the risks of their enterprises and
would be unable to secure adequate insurance coverage to protect against
multi-generational losses. As Dean Prosser stated, "duty... could be
founded only on the foreseeability of some harm to the plaintiff in fact
injured. 'Negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.' ,2"9
B. Re-examining the Policy Goals of the Tort and Workers'
Compensation Systems
1. Utilitarian Goals
The utilitarian objective of the tort and workers' compensation sys-
tems has long been to reduce the net costs of accidents through imple-
mentation of appropriate safety measures and efficient allocation of
risk.28° Thus, the workers' compensation system imposed the economic
costs of occupational injuries on the enterprise on the theory that the
enterprise is most able to bear the loss and can incorporate such losses
into its costs by passing those costs on to consumers of its products.
28 I
Moreover, because workers as a class tend to underestimate their risks in
the workplace setting, employers could incorporate this risk factor into
their overall costs, including those associated with health and safety
measures.
282
Notwithstanding the overall advantages of the workers' compensation
system, the utilitarian goals of the system collapse when confronted with
the claims of reproductively or genetically harmed workers. Because
proof of causation, embodied in the work-relatedness requirement, has
279. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1953) (quoting Palsgraf, 248
N.Y. at 341).
280. See generally G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970) (discussing framework
under which different systems of accident law may be evaluated); Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972) (analyzing social function of liability for negligent
acts).
281. Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 11, at 654-55. The authors note that this well-
accepted principle contrasts with nineteenth-century workplace injury theory:
[it was assumed that employees were compensated for the known risks of em-
ployment through adjustment in the wage scale. This assumption, in turn,
rested on several other [fallacious] assumptions. Among these were that the
workers could accurately assess the probability and severity of the risk, that
they had sufficient bargaining power to demand higher wages based on those
risks, and that the risk-related wage increase would be used to buy insurance or
some other buffer against the happening of the risk.
Id. at 655 (footnote omitted).
282. G. Calabresi, supra note 280, at 245. Professor Calabresi stated:
An allocation [of costs] to nonfaulty employers could and did lead to cheaper
cost avoidance because it resulted in adequate evaluation of the risk of injury
and in its full retention as an economic factor internal to the employment con-
tract. Workmen's compensation thus eased the problem in one area. But it
made no change in the fault system, which still largely ignores the question of
which category of possible loss bearer is most likely to be adequately informed
of the costs involved.
Id. at 245-46.
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proved to be a significant barrier to compensability, it is doubtful that
substantial numbers of persons claiming reproductive or genetic harm
will be compensated under the present interpretation of the system. The
absence of an economic burden gives the employer no incentive to con-
duct safety monitoring or to implement health measures. Moreover, the
system frequently forces reproductively and genetically injured workers
to bear the costs of their legitimate injuries-a result running counter to
the goal of loss-spreading.
The tort system has failed in the same manner. First, the worker must
circumvent the exclusivity of workers' compensation to enter the tort
system. Second, although theoretically the injured worker can receive
greater monetary recovery in the tort system due to the availability of
compensation for pain and suffering,283 the worker must confront the
obstacle of cause-in-fact. Third, courts have been reluctant to impose
liability on an enterprise when the full extent of the liability may be ines-
timable at the time the enterprise must purchase insurance to cover the
risk of the particular activity.284 Thus, the very limited availability of the
tort system to provide redress for persons with occupational reproductive
or genetic injuries demonstrates that a system grounded in the traditional
concept of accidents is incapable, absent modification, of handling the
new class of environmental injuries that will arise in the 1990s and
beyond.
The inherent risk-bearing capacity of industry-in contrast to the indi-
vidual worker-renders it reasonable that industry be required to bear
the full extent of the losses associated with its activities. This makes
sense from an economic standpoint because industry is in the superior
position to manage those risks through compensation, insurance, and
loss-spreading. Assuming this is true, issues arise regarding the respec-
tive roles of workers' compensation and tort law in advancing these
goals, and regarding the relative merit of the legislature compared to the
judiciary in implementing appropriate solutions.
A primary effect of the failure of the tort and compensation systems
with respect to toxic reproductive and genetic workplace injuries is the
problem of underdeterrence. In the workers' compensation context, ac-
cident prevention is subordinate to compensation because, at least theo-
retically, compensation should be available to an injured worker even in
situations in which the employer could not have avoided the injury.28
283. Statistics compiled in the 1970s revealed that the average total compensation ben-
efits paid for a worker permanently disabled by a workplace injury were $4,000. Approx-
imately one quarter of those workers brought tort actions that yielded an average of
$40,000 per person. See Weiler, supra note 185, at 829 (citing Bernstein, Third Party
Claims in Workers' Compensation: A Proposal To Do More With Less, 1977 Wash.
U.L.Q. 543, 562-64) (noting that these statistics predate explosion in occupational disease
claims, including those related to asbestos).
284. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 168-69, 159 N.E. 896,
898-99 (1928); Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra note 209, § 4, at 25.
285. See Haas, supra note 104, at 849. "Indeed, workers' compensation requires pay-
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When toxic reproductive or genetic injuries fall within the coverage of
the workers' compensation system, but are not compensable within that
scheme, employers not only are invited to ignore accident prevention, but
they also are rewarded for engaging in more egregious behavior such as
concealment of occupational hazards.286
Furthermore, the problem of overdeterrence arises when the system
expands to accommodate novel types of claims. Thus, imposing liability
to the outer limits of foreseeability would tend to discourage, rather than
encourage, any safety measures by the employer.287 Employers might
conceivably elect to abandon their industrial activities rather than bear
the risks associated with those activities. The risk of overdeterrence is
especially acute because traditionally liability has been viewed as all-or-
nothing once the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard has been
met.
2 88
The challenge to reformers is to structure the system so as to en-
courage employers to continue engaging in socially beneficial activities
while reducing the hazards associated with them. This result can be
achieved exclusively through the market system, by encouraging volun-
tary accident prevention measures, or by legislative decree.
2. Compensation
Difficulty in distinguishing most reproductive and genetic injuries
from background occurrence levels28 9 fosters concern that the law will
operate to overcompensate some plaintiffs whose injury actually was at-
tributable, in whole or in major part, to a cause other than the workplace
environment. This uncertainty arises primarily from scientific uncer-
tainty in identifying the precise cause of a particular reproductive or ge-
netic event.290 But uncertainty also can arise from an inability to
distinguish between multiple factors that combine to cause the injury.29'
If the system operates in the traditional mode, compensation would
ment even in cases where the injury is clearly the employee's fault and there is nothing-
short of firing or not hiring him-that the employer could have done." Id.
286. See supra notes 104-76 and accompanying text.
287. This observation also applies to situations in which the state-of-the-art defense
has not been allowed in product liability actions. See generally Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (state-of-the-art defense not
allowed and therefore medical community's lack of knowledge of dangers of asbestos not
a defense).
288. See Robinson, supra note 253, at 784; Rosenberg, supra note 251, at 862-66.
289. Thus, in the "Agent Orange" litigation, the court opined that the plaintiff's al-
leged injuries, including reproductive injuries, could be attributable to a variety of causes
and not just the dioxin to which they were exposed. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 777 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
290. See supra notes 58-98 and accompanying text.
291. For example, a claimant's infertility may have been the combined result of the
occupational exposure and such contributing factors as a pre-existing genetic defect, hor-
monal imbalances, or previous infection. See Office of Technology Assessment, Infertil-
ity, supra note 24, at 61-76. For a discussion of apportionment of occupational disease
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likely be denied for failure to prove the requisite work-relatedness or cau-
sation. If causation requirements are eased to recognize such injuries,
however, the risk of overcompensation may be substantial.
Because tort law traditionally serves the goal of making the plaintiff
whole,292 the system attempts to avoid payment of money to those whose
injuries are speculative. The system has far less of a problem, however,
denying compensation to persons whose injuries were probable but
whose proof fell below the recognized preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard. Thus, while the system has incorporated undercompensation,
it has found overcompensation intolerable.29 a
While notions of fairness underlie the compensation goal, whether ex-
press or implicit,294 the requirements of proof of causation tend to act as
a check on the system to prevent unbridled overcompensation. Relaxa-
tion of the requirements of proof of causation would not necessarily
cause compensation to run amok, but would reduce undercompensation
and would likely result in aggregate verdicts that more accurately reflect
the actual causal effect between exposures and injuries.2 95 Moreover, de-
fendant-employers remain in the best position to investigate and mitigate
the risks to workers in the occupational setting. Employers are able to
spread any incremental increase in loss due to overcompensation by ob-
taining insurance coverage and passing the costs on to consumers.
IV. THE 1990S AND BEYOND: PROPOSAL FOR RESPONDING TO THE
COMING CRISIS IN REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC
WORKPLACE INJURIES
Industry is in the best position to conduct the necessary research and
benefits in the multiple causation situation, see Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 111, at 665-
78.
292. Special Committee on the Tort Liability System, Towards a Jurisprudence of In-
jury: The Continuing Creation of a System of Substantive Justice in American Tort Law
4-29-32 (1984) [hereinafter Special Committee on Tort Liability].
293. The fear of overcompensation accounts, for example, for the reticence of courts to
entertain claims for increased risk of illness. See, e.g., Ayers v. Jackson Township, 106
N.J. 557, 597, 525 A.2d 287, 307-08 (1987) (recognizing that enhanced risk claim would
be windfall for persons who do not ultimately develop the disease). The Ayers court,
however, did recognize a cause of action for increased risk of illness. See supra note 266
and accompanying text.
294. Special Committee on Tort Liability, supra note 292, at 4-41-52. Courts some-
times have used fairness to justify granting compensation to plaintiffs presenting weak
evidence. Id. at 4-49.
295. Validation of the system in the public mind may be an important reason that
supporters of traditional causation rules reject novel approaches. Professor Rosenberg
has noted that advocates of adherence to strict requirements of particularistic evidence
for the proof of causation may believe that juries are more likely to have strong convic-
tions in the truth of their verdicts under traditional rules. See Rosenberg, supra note 25 1,
at 872. Thus, a public belief may exist that verdicts should be based on something more
than mere probability. Professor Rosenberg states, however, that uncertainty and inaccu-
racy is inherent in the traditional system as well, and that strict application of traditional
causation rules merely "shield[s] the public from having to come to terms with the irre-
ducible uncertainty of court judgments." Id. at 873-74.
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development to determine the toxicity of the substances it uses and to
which its workers and related persons may be exposed. Logic dictates,
therefore, that reform measures should revolve around incentives for in-
dustry to obtain this information and undertake health and safety
measures.
Statistics indicate that reported cases of occupational disease are on
the rise in this country,2 96 and many of these diseases are reproductive or
genetic in nature.2 97 The problem requires a two-fold response. First,
archaic presumptions inherent in both the workers' compensation and
tort systems must be discarded to allow entrance of reproductive and
genetic claims into the systems alongside more traditional types of
claims. This includes relaxing the standard of proof required to show
causation and recognizing a cause of action in tort for employer miscon-
duct in addition to recovery under workers' compensation. Second,
some legislative remedy must be enacted in areas where particular ur-
gency or uniformity is warranted.
A. Modification of the Mechanisms of Liability
1. Realigning the Burden of Causation
Persons injured by toxic reproductive or genetic exposures in the
workplace may encounter a paucity of scientific information regarding
the potential effects of the substances to which they were exposed. Typi-
cally, these claimants will present evidence of probabilities in the form of
epidemiological or toxicological studies29 but will not be able to make
the necessary showing of cause-in-fact. The tribunal's response to the
absence of a showing of cause-in-fact, the acknowledged backbone of the
American concept of causation, most likely will result in foreclosing the
claimant from recovery. Although circumstantial evidence has consist-
ently met with approval as a means of proving causation in tort actions
generally,299 probabilistic causation has encountered a cold reception.'
Some adjustment of traditional cause-in-fact requirements is war-
ranted in cases involving reproductive or genetic injuries. Several factors
underscore the persuasiveness of this approach. First, in allowing recov-
ery based on market share liability and risk-contribution theories, tort
law has moved toward allowing some alteration in causation-related re-
quirements. If any "law of toxic torts" has developed as a discrete cate-
296. Cases of occupational disease reported to the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1987
demonstrated a 39% increase over such reported cases in 1986. Some explanation for
this dramatic increase may be found in the more precise recording of occupational illness
as mandated by federal guidelines. See Office of Technology Assessment, Genetic Moni-
toring, supra note 9, at 45.
297. See id at 55.
298. See supra notes 61-98 and accompanying text.
299. See Firak, supra note 252, at 332.
300. See generally supra notes 249-79 and accompanying text (discussing the courts'
antipathy toward such probability-based theories of causation).
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gory in response to the special needs of toxic injuries, these special
rules-insofar as they have developed-are its salient points.30'
Second, claimants in toxic exposure cases have severely limited access
to the evidence necessary to prove their cases, particularly if the injury is
one that is associated with a high background occurrence rate. Statistical
studies may be the only available evidence; clinical practitioners may be
unable to provide any further insight into the causative factors of the
claimants' disorders and may in fact rely on the very same statistical
studies in their clinical evaluations.
Third, compelling policy goals justify an alteration in the traditional
concepts of causation for workers' compensation and tort. Employers
are in a positi6n superior to their workers to determine, assess, and bear
the risks associated with the hazards of their enterprises.30 2 Indeed, the
economic disparity between workers and their employers, and the inher-
ent inequities of the employment relationship, enhance the need for em-
ployers to be responsible for the costs of the enterprise. This concept is
warranted from an economic, social, and moral standpoint. Further-
more, for deterrence to play an appropriate role in the tort marketplace,
compensation must be available to those who are injured as a result of
exposures in the workplace.
Accordingly, in cases in which claimants make a showing of general
statistical causation, the burden should shift to the employer to disprove
causation 3  The claimant's prima facie case should consist of: (1) epi-
301. See, eg., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612-13, 607 P.2d 924,
937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145-46, (establishing market share liability for DES cases),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 200, 342
N.W.2d 37, 53 (1984) (establishing risk contribution liability for DES cases); Ayers v.
Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557, 592, 525 A.2d 287, 305 (1987) (recognizing availability
of cause of action for enhanced risk of disease upon showing of quantified risk).
302. This disparity between the employer and employee in terms of risk assessment
capabilities is particularly noticeable in the occupational disease context. While analysts
could argue that a worker can gauge the safety of the workplace vis-a-vis accidents, thus
rendering deterrence and economic incentives to employers relatively unnecessary, this
same statement could not be true with respect to occupational disease, due to the in-
creased hardship to the worker of obtaining and interpreting information regarding the
exposures and injuries. See Haas, supra note 104, at 875 (citing Smith, Protecting Work-
ers' Health and Safety, in Instead of Regulation 311, 327 (R. Poole ed. 1982)).
303. Such a proposal necessarily eschews the cause-in-fact requirement in favor of
probabilistic evidence. One commentator argues that while such a violation of the cause-
in-fact requirement is acceptable in the unique circumstances of indeterminate defendants
in DES cases, it is unacceptable outside that context. See Firak, supra note 252, at 334-
35. DES produces signature diseases that are clinically distinguishable from background
levels of related diseases. The DES plaintiffs' sole difficulty was in identifying the specific
defendant that manufactured the DES ingested by their mothers, causing injury to them
in utero. See id. at 334. The author contrasts the "scientific sense" of this situation with
the issue of whether epidemiological evidence should be allowed to satisfy the cause-in-
fact requirement, concluding that epidemiological evidence should not be so used. See id.
at 334-35. Many DES plaintiffs are capable of satisfying both the general and specific
causation requirements with respect to the relationship between their disease and the
substance to which they were exposed. See id. Thus, the DES cases are not analogous to
most cases involving persons suffering reproductive or genetic impairment through expo-
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demiological evidence tending to establish a scientific relationship be-
tween the toxic substance and the claimant's reproductive or genetic
injury; (2) the presence of the substance in the employer's workplace in a
location that would have exposed the claimant to the substance; (3) a
temporal relationship between the worker's employment with the em-
ployer and the presence of the substance in the workplace; and (4)
clinical proof of the presence of reproductive or genetic injury in the
claimant.3" Once the plaintiff makes this prima facie showing, the em-
ployer may submit evidence to the factfinder that tends to refute the
claimant's epidemiological studies or clinical evidence or that challenges
the worker's exposure in time, location, and amount. The mere fact that
a claimant's epidemiological study falls short of the highest level of scien-
tific or medical certainty should not prevent its use to satisfy the prima
facie showing of causation.30 5 Reasonable probabilities suggested by the
study will be sufficient.
This proposal only represents a shifting of the burden. Claimants will
not necessarily recover merely because they are permitted to reach the
trier of fact. If the employer can reasonably refute a claimant's evidence
with conflicting studies or clinical information, the claimants may not
recover. But if the employer cannot refute the claimant's initial show-
ing--even where the defendant's lack of evidence results from scientific
sure to occupational toxins. The persons in the latter cases may not be able to demon-
strate the requisite particularized causation through no fault of their own and in the
absence of any indication of a signature disease. Perhaps the day will come when signa-
ture genetic defects can be associated with specific toxic substances; that day will arrive
more quickly if the law emphasizes the goal of deterrence through various means, includ-
ing incentives to conduct research and development.
304. This framework is similar, although not identical, to the proposal presented in
Hall & Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response To Mr. Dore, 7 Harv. Envtl.
L. Rev. 441 (1983). Speaking generally in terms of chemical exposure cases, Hall and
Silbergeld place the burden upon the plaintiff to demonstrate "exposure significant
enough to trigger disease." Id. at 445. In most occupational disease cases, workers are
underinformed as to the level and extent of their exposure to hazardous substances in the
workplace. Although this may be changing from a regulatory standpoint, see Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988 & Supp.
1991), numerous potential claims exist at the present time for which pitifully little infor-
mation exists. Therefore, imposing the burden on the employer to produce information
regarding the level and extent of the worker's exposure to the toxic substance is
appropriate.
305. But see Dore, supra note 63, at 432-33 (repudiating the use of epidemiological
evidence as sole proof of causation in toxic tort cases because of its lack of scientific
certainty). Professor Dore has stated:
First, epidemiology cannot determine which particular factor caused a particu-
lar person's disease, but only what factors are statistically associated with the
occurrence of disease in groups of people. Its usefulness to particular plaintiffs
therefore relates more directly to issues of risk than of actual occurrence. Sec-
ond, a host of technical and practical considerations limit epidemiology's use-
fulness even in assessing general risks.
Id. at 433 (footnotes omitted). The proposal set forth in this Article does not abandon
cause-in-fact entirely, however, but shifts the burden to the defendant to produce infor-
mation tending to refute its existence.
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uncertainty-the defendant may be required to bear the loss. Due to
broad problems of scientific uncertainty, however, some undercompensa-
tion will remain when plaintiffs cannot make out their prima facie
cases.3 0 6 The key element to this proposal is that it is incumbent upon
the employer to provide exculpatory evidence regarding exposure in the
workplace-the area over which the employer exercises the highest
control.
Admittedly, the initial effect of implementation of this proposal will be
over-recovery. After a period of potential over-payment and adjustment,
however, over-payment problems will be minimized as employers be-
come motivated to conduct their own workplace studies and adjust or
eliminate the risk of many workplace toxins. This period of adjustment
can be shortened by implementing the legislative recommendations set
forth in this Article at the same time that the judicial and administrative
reforms take effect. Moreover, the employer will have an opportunity to
decide whether it is willing to bear the various risks inherent in the enter-
prise and then may secure adequate insurance against losses related to
the risks of overcompensation.
In the workers' compensation context, this burden-shifting would have
the effect of a presumption of work-relatedness. For reasons of symme-
try, a similar presumption should be allowed in employee tort actions
that fall outside of the limitations the workers' compensation exclusivity
doctrine.307 When the employer is the defendant, the identical policy
306. Professor Delgado has proposed a collective liability scheme that reflects some of
these concerns regarding causal indeterminacy. He has proposed that a representative
plaintiff satisfy the following elements of a prima facie case:
(i) that plaintiffs have suffered an injury; (ii) that the injury be one that could
have resulted from either natural or human causes, acting separately and with-
out synergy; (iii) that the injuries be causally indeterminate-that is, not identi-
fiable as humanly or naturally caused; (iv) that the defendant is the only
possible human cause; and (v) that the population injured, mode of risk, and
other variables be uniform and stable enough to permit calculation of the in-
creased number of victims.
Delgado, supra note 252, at 899-900. Upon the plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie
case, the burden would shift to the defendant to establish noncausation in individual
cases, to show that the plaintiff has overestimated the number of persons within the class,
or to prove the existence of another defendant. See id. at 900. The plaintiff would re-
cover from the particular defendant an amount equal to the class's aggregate injuries
associated with that defendant's activities. See id. at 901. This level of relaxation of the
causation requirements results in a kind of judicially enacted insurance program for all
persons who were exposed or might have been exposed to toxic substances. As heretofore
stated, such a broad-reaching rule is better left to the legislatures for consideration and
appropriate action. For an analysis of some of the anticipated criticisms of the Delgado
proposal, see id. at 902-08. One anticipated problem is the possibility that actions would
arise in which a class of indeterminate plaintiffs sues a class of indeterminate defendants,
thus invoking both the Delgado suggestion and the theory of market-share liability. See
id. at 907-08.
307. Shifting the burden of causation in tort actions in which a non-employer third
party is the defendant also is consistent with sound remedial goals. Assume the situation
in which a third-party chemical manufacturer provides materials to the worker's em-
ployer for use in production of the employer's products. Assume further that this manu-
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goals are served by allowing this presumption in the litigation context.
Similarly, the presumption should also extend to a spouse and offspring
who bring tort actions against the worker's employer for injuries arising
out of the worker's exposure to occupational toxins. The fact that the
employer may not have been able to anticipate the reproductive or ge-
netic risk to persons other than the worker should be irrelevant under
this scheme. Cost distribution and market forces eventually will regulate
whatever seemingly inequitable results may occur in the initial stages of
implementation. 0 8
Additionally, states ideally should mandate some form of proportion-
ate recovery reflecting the percentage probability that the employer's ac-
tivities actually contributed to the employee's injury. Proportionate
recovery would increase the efficiency of the employer's cost allocations
by holding the employer liable only for the proportion attributable to the
employer's workplace environment. 319  Accordingly, the defendant, in
facturer has been inattentive to the health and safety risks associated with its chemical,
making little or no effort to determine the potential effects of the chemical in the work-
place environment. If the employer is required to pay workers' compensation benefits to
its injured employees as a result of toxic exposure to the manufacturer's materials, the
employer will bear the costs of compensation-albeit at the reduced rate of workers'
compensation-and of spreading the loss. Moreover, the employer will assess the risk
and may, in fact, decide to eliminate the manufacturer's materials from its production
process, if that option is available. If the employee cannot make the requisite showing of
causation in a third-party action against the manufacturer, the employee is left un-
dercompensated and the manufacturer is underdeterred. If, instead, the manufacturer is
subject to the suggested presumption of causation-with the showing of existence of the
substance in the workplace augmented to require the presence of the defendant's sub-
stance-the culpable manufacturer will be held accountable for the costs of its conduct.
Ideally, this would result in enhanced communication between the manufacturer and the
employer regarding use of toxic substances in the workplace.
308. One pair of commentators has found the following advantages in allowing the
shifting of the burden of proof to the employer in the workers' compensation context: (1)
the superior position of the employer vis-i-vis the information related to the exposure and
the litigation process; (2) "the increase in costs due to the employer's added burden is
more likely to accurately reflect the true costs of occupational disease"; (3) the priority of
compensating victims of occupational disease; and (4) ultimate reduction of costs, as em-
ployers will likely not contest many claims. Peirce & Dworkin, supra note I 1, at 682.
309. See id. at 681-83 (proposing shift in burden of proof to defendant to prove non-
work-relatedness and apportionment of benefits in workers' compensation context). The
authors further propose establishment of a fund to compensate injured workers for the
additional amount of total disability above the percentage apportioned to the employer.
The taxpayers, compensation insurers, and employees would pay equally into such a
fund. See id. at 681-82, 685. The authors' rationale for the proposed fund is as follows:
Requiring the claimant to bear the burden of proof [of percentage of work-
relatedness] will not result in claimants going without compensation if special
funds are utilized; it would merely more accurately allocate costs and allow
businesses to be more competitive. In addition, in the absence of a special fund,
an injured employee could go uncompensated for that part of the injury appor-
tioned. That would seem unconscionably harsh and contrary to the rationales
behind the workers' compensation system and would encourage the courts to
continue avoiding apportionment.
Id. at 685. Employees apparently would receive payments from such a fund even if their
injuries were attributable in part to hereditary factors or environmental factors beyond
1992]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
addressing the plaintiff's case, should submit evidence of the propor-
tional relationship between the workplace exposure and other possible
contributing sources of the injury. Although critics of proportionate re-
covery object to its reliance on proof of probabilistic causation, toxic re-
productive and genetic hazards are particularly suited to this mode of
liability. Indeed, as one commentator has concluded, "proportional re-
covery need not be conceptualized as compensation for risk as such, but
rather as a means of compensating for actual harm given limited infor-
mation about causation. '310
2. Recognizing Tort Actions for Employer Misconduct
The latency periods often associated with reproductive and genetic in-
juries leave open the door for employer misconduct. Such misconduct
may not rise to the level of an intentional tort, but may be manifested in
failure to properly disclose either occupational hazards or potentially
work-related known adverse health conditions. 31  Long latency periods
reduce the probability that the injured worker will be able to make the
necessary showing of work-relatedness for workers' compensation. Ab-
sent an avenue of liability in the tort system, employers engaging in un-
scrupulous and deceptive tactics would benefit from the shield of
immunity granted by the exclusivity doctrine. The problem is particu-
larly egregious when employers fraudulently conceal workers' health
conditions and deliberately fail to conduct health and safety assessments
or warn employees of workplace hazards. The latter problem can affect a
single employer or, more noxiously, an entire industry.
Piercing the exclusivity doctrine to allow tort actions against employ-
ers would be a salutory means of remedying these transgressions. The
system should permit an injured worker to collect workers' compensa-
tion benefits to the fullest extent available, while at the same time main-
taining a tort action against the employer for extreme misconduct. Such
an action should be based on intentional misconduct, gross negligence,
recklessness, fraudulent concealment, or other willful or wanton miscon-
duct. Any compensatory damages recovered by the claimant in the tort
the occupational setting. Allowing employees to recover for such contributing risks
would place them in a position superior to other persons whose identical injuries had no
workplace connection, and who, even in the most apportionment-minded jurisdictions,
would receive no compensation for risks associated with non-defendant activities. Cer-
tain kinds of funds may indeed have an appropriate place in handling the problems asso-
ciated with toxic exposures generally. See infra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
The Peirce and Dworkin proposal's inequities lead to the conclusion that a more general
insurance scheme for toxic injuries may be necessary. While such a notion may be worth
considering, particularly in light of the difficulty the system has had in managing the
explosion of asbestos cases, no such scheme would be forthcoming for quite some time.
310. Farber, supra note 270, at 1241.
311. Some employers may choose to monitor their employees for either occupational
susceptibilities or evidence of occupational illness. For a discussion of the uses and mis-
uses of the results of screening and monitoring in the workplace, see Office of Technology
Assessment, Genetic Monitoring, supra note 9, at 126-31.
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action should be reduced by any amount of workers' compensation bene-
fits paid by the employer with regard to the same injury.
A salient feature of the employer misconduct tort action should be the
availability of punitive damages against the employer. Allowing punitive
damages would serve deterrence goals and provide relief in tort for the
most egregious employer conduct. Moreover, allowing a tort action and
subjecting employers to punitive damages would remove the current veil
of immunity from employers accused of exposing their employees to tox-
ins and place such employers in positions equal to other tortfeasors en-
gaged in extreme activities injurious to others.
In Gulden v. Crown Zellerback Corp.,312 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the employees' action
against their employer might be maintained outside the exclusivity of the
Oregon workers' compensation scheme. The plaintiffs claimed injury as
a result of their employer's order that they clean up toxic PCBs on their
hands and knees after an accidental spill. The plaintiffs claimed that the
levels of PCBs in their bodies exceeded established safety levels and that
the employer's conduct rose to the level of an intentional battery. In
finding that the action was not barred by the exclusivity doctrine, the
Ninth Circuit stated that "a jury could conclude that the intention to
injure [the employees] was deliberate where the employer had an oppor-
tunity to weigh the consequences and to make a conscious choice among
possible courses of action."
'3 13
The test in Gulden should be extended to actions alleging willful, reck-
less, grossly negligent, and fraudulent conduct. Moreover, courts should
allow an action where the employer deliberately chose to remain in igno-
rance of any hazards. The justifiability of the employer's ignorance
would define the distinction between mere negligence, covered only by
workers' compensation, and gross negligence giving rise to a tort action.
3. Legislative Solution for Subsequent Generations
Strong arguments exist both in favor of and in opposition to extending
tort remedies to reach victims in subsequent generations who develop
injuries from an initial workplace harm.3 14 On the one hand, such claims
in the worker's hereditary line are certainly foreseeable. On the other
hand, social policy concerns provide ample reason for the law to disfavor
recognition of such actions.
Extending duty to the outer limits of foreseeability raises questions of
manageability and risk allocation. In Enright v. Eli Lilly and Co.,115 the
New York Court of Appeals refused to extend liability to preconception
312. Gulden v. Crown Zellerback Corp., 890 F.2d 195, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1989).
313. Id.
314. See supra notes 227-47 and accompanying text.
315. Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377, 387-88, 570 N.E.2d 198, 204, 568
N.Y.S.2d 550, 553 (1991), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 197 (1991); see also supra notes 239-47
and accompanying text (discussing Enright).
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injuries on these policy grounds and thus limited liability to those indi-
viduals who ingested the DES or were exposed to it in utero. Particu-
larly in genetic-injury cases, it is impossible to accurately predict the
probability of expression of abnormalities in subsequent generations.
This uncertainty obscures the ability of insurers and employers to accu-
rately measure their risk of exposure to claims. Coupled with a discovery
statute of limitations, claim exposure could be virtually infinite, with the
difficulty of defending against such claims increasing as each generation
passes.
Notwithstanding these arguments, policy reasons exist for allowing
some means of recovery for members of subsequent generations. If the
employer is not required to pay the costs of these injuries, the full burden
falls upon the injured persons and society.316 Moreover, although the
extent of injury to persons born in subsequent generations may be as
severe as or even more severe than the initial injury to the worker, identi-
fication of the injury's source and proof of causation will be more difficult
due to the latency period. Meanwhile, if the initial injury is covered by
workers' compensation and the actions for injury to subsequent genera-
tions disallowed, the undeterred defendant has little incentive to curtail
the hazardous activity.
The need for a balance between the goals of compensation and deter-
rence on the one hand and manageability on the other warrants legisla-
tive establishment of a "contingent injury fund." '317 Financed by
industry as an ongoing cost of their enterprises, this fund would compen-
sate subsequent generations as they actually develop illnesses or other
injuries related to the initial occupational exposure. Persons presenting
claims to the fund for payment would benefit from a relaxed standard of
causation similar to the shifting of burdens proposed herein. Similarly,
recovery should be on a proportionate basis. For some persons, payment
through the fund could result in reduced compensation from that which
the claimant might have received if the claim had gone before a jury in a
tort action. But on balance, the availability of some compensation for all
who can make the necessary showing is a desired result.
Moreover, for employers, ongoing payment to the fund would repre-
sent a cost of business that can be absorbed into the cost of their prod-
ucts. The system should allow for adjustment of contribution levels on
the basis of relative risk. Thus, if an enterprise becomes less likely to
actually cause injuries to subsequent generations, either through imple-
mentation of health and safety measures or through abandoning alto-
316. See Note, Preconception Torts: Foreseeing the Unconceived, 48 U. Colo. L. Rev.
621, 625 (1977).
317. This approach is similar to a proposal made more than three decades ago in the
context of radiation injuries. See Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a
New Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 259, 281-98 (1960). See generally
Comment, Radiation and Preconception Injuries: Some Interesting Problems in Tort Law,
28 Sw. L.J. 414, 425-32 (1974) (analyzing legislative and common-law issues related to
genetic injuries from exposure to radiation).
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gether certain hazardous enterprises, a reduction of payment would be
appropriate. This reward would act as an incentive to undertake injury-
prevention measures.
B. Enhancing the Utilitarian Goals of the System
1. Medical Monitoring for Employees
Medical monitoring is a direct means of achieving reduction in the
costs of workplace accidents by making an ongoing investment in illness
detection and early diagnosis. Optimally, the aggregate cost of medical
monitoring to the employer would be less than the costs of paying work-
ers' compensation and tort judgments in the absence of monitoring. A
principal concern is how employers' insurers will use medical monitoring
tests. An appropriate balance of interests is necessary so as not to trans-
gress the privacy rights of employees.
Some form of medical monitoring-either to obtain exposure data or
to screen for certain medical conditions-is already required by various
OSHA standards related to hazardous occupational exposures.318 The
general OSHA test for monitoring is to avoid any "material impairment
of health" by the worker.319 Moreover, relevant OSHA standards desig-
nate specific details regarding medical monitoring rather than leaving
them to the employer's discretion.320 Typically, OSHA-mandated moni-
toring requires a general medical examination; rarely does it require
more invasive testing.32'
Although medical surveillance is generally predictive and noninvasive,
some concern has arisen that monitoring ex ante could result in employ-
ers screening out employees who are more sensitive to certain hazards to
avoid high costs at a later date.322 For example, debate has ensued re-
garding the appropriate OSHA approach to monitoring lead levels in em-
ployees' blood. The rule currently requires ambient air lead level
318. See OSH Act, supra note 3, § 655 (granting authority to OSHA to promulgate
occupational safety and health standards). OSHA may determine that a health and
safety standard is needed based upon information obtained from individuals (including an
individual employee), labor organizations, political groups, or NIOSH. See id.
§ 655(b)(1). OSHA also retains the authority to modify or revoke existing standards. See
id. § 655(b). In some instances, OSHA may issue emergency temporary standards
(ETSs) if, in its determination, employees are exposed to "grave danger" from toxic or
otherwise physically harmful substances in the workplace. See id. § 655(c)(1). More-
over, OSHA may from time to time issue guidelines for employers, even where no perma-
nent or temporary standard exists. See, &g., Safety and Health Program Management
Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 3904, 3904 (1989) (detailing how OSHA constructed new safety
and health guidelines to be used by general industry, shipyards, longshoring and marine
terminals).
319. OSH Act, supra note 3, § 655(b)(5).
320. See id. § 655(b)(7).
321. The presence of lead in the workplace requires periodic blood tests of employees
and possible removal of an employee from a high lead work area if blood lead levels
exceed certain prescribed safety levels. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1990).
322. See Office of Technology Assessment, Genetic Monitoring, supra note 9, at 106.
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measurements to determine exposure coupled with periodic blood testing
to monitor the workers' health.323 While this example is the farthest the
OSH Act has gone with invasive medical surveillance, it may set a prece-
dent for other standards. 24 Although the OSH Act provides that em-
ployees may not be discriminated against for exercising any right granted
under the Act,325 private employer plans for medical surveillance fall
outside of the OSHA prohibition unless the program violates an OSHA
standard.326
Common-law principles of privacy and confidentiality in medical mon-
itoring generally require that the worker have a right to refuse the moni-
toring, to know the results of the tests and any further information that is
relevant to the worker's family, and to have the monitoring tests kept
confidential by the examiner.3 27 If a valid public interest exists in the
worker's medical information, however, a breach of confidentiality may
be justified.32
These general rules are complicated somewhat when the health per-
sonnel conducting the monitoring are employees of the employer. The
legal and ethical relationship between the health care personnel and the
worker may be compromised by the apparent agency relationship be-
tween the health care personnel and the employer.3 29 Thus, problems
may arise if an employee does not wish the employer to have access to
the employee's medical test results.33 In more extreme cases, a physi-
cian or employer might release information regarding the workers' medi-
cal screening tests to the public.33'
323. See OSH Act, supra note 3, § 651.
324. For a summary of the history of the OSHA lead standard, see Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment, Genetic Monitoring, supra note 9, at 106.
325. See OSH Act, supra note 3, § 660(c).
326. See Office of Technology Assessment, Genetic Monitoring, supra note 9, at 106.
327. See id. at 116.
328. See id.
329. See id. at 117.
330. See id. at 118. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.2, 1904.7 (1972) (providing for employee
access to medical records, but silent on employer's access). OSHA requires that employ-
ers maintain records of occupational injuries and illnesses. Although some points of dif-
ference exist as to the definition of an occupational illness, the most reasonable
interpretation was advanced by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
in 1980 in holding that the recordkeeping requirement applied not only to illnesses result-
ing directly from workplace exposures, but also to conditions "in which the occupational
environment either was a contributing factor to the illness or aggravated a pre-existing
condition." General Motors Corp. (Inland Div.) 1980 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 24,743
(Aug. 29, 1980).
331. A small minority of states has statutory provisions designed to protect patients
from unauthorized disclosures of medical information. See Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10-16
(West 1985); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-16-525 (1991); R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-4 (1987);
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (1989); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 146.82 (West 1989). A few states
have statutes granting some degree of protection expressly to genetic information. See
Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann. § 13-109 (1990); R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-4 (1987); Utah
Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (1989). For a general discussion of confidentiality duties, both com-
mon-law and statutory, within the context of genetic information, see Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment, Genetic Monitoring, supra note 9, at 116-22.
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With respect to workers' compensation benefits, an injured worker is
entitled to, among other benefits, unlimited payment of medical and hos-
pital expenses incurred as a result of the occupational injury. 332 Many
states require that the medical benefits be reasonably required or neces-
sary333 and not merely for personal comfort. To extend these workers'
compensation benefits to medical and genetic monitoring does not re-
quire a significant leap of the imagination. It does require, however, that
the worker be able to demonstrate the existence of a covered occupa-
tional injury in the first instance. Such a system would be useful, for
example, where a male worker suffers from occupationally induced
oligospermia, 3  a cause of infertility. Assuming a showing of work-re-
latedness, the worker trying to conceive should be entitled to full medical
payment of reasonable and necessary medical treatments to correct the
problem and, ultimately, have children. A worker who is not trying to
conceive should be entitled to medical monitoring of his condition to
determine whether he continues to suffer damage and, if so, to what ex-
tent. Thus, this system provides some measure of equity between the
reproducing worker and the non-reproducing worker.
Any further mandated ex post monitoring within the workers' com-
pensation context poses many of the same privacy and confidentiality
problems as does mandated ex ante monitoring. Accordingly, this issue
would be better left to OSHA rather than to the workers' compensation
administrative tribunal. Voluntary ex post monitoring at the insistence
of the worker, on the other hand, arguably may be available outside
workers' compensation. This concept is supported by Acevedo v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co., 33 in which a New York court held that an employee's
action against an employer for medical monitoring for alleged asbestos
injuries was not barred, because medical monitoring was not compensa-
ble under the state's workers' compensation law.
In Ayers v. Jackson Township,336 the New Jersey Supreme Court set
forth a broad standard for allowing medical monitoring claims in the
area of toxic exposures. The court allowed the plaintiffs' claims for pre-
symptom medical surveillance where toxic pollutants had leached into a
drinking water supply from the township landfill. The court set forth the
factors to be weighed in determining the reasonableness of the
surveillance:
The likelihood of disease is but one element in determining the reason-
ableness of medical intervention.... Accordingly, we hold that the
cost of medical surveillance is a compensable item of damages where
332. See 2 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 61.10, at 10-198 (1989).
333. See eg., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 342.035 (Michie Bobbs-Merrill 1983) (reasonable
and fair); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-120 (1988) (reasonably required and will relieve pain);
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.36.010 (1990) (necessary and proper).
334. Oligospermia refers to a low sperm count. See Stedman's Medical Dictionary 980
(24th ed. 1982).
335. Acevedo v. Consolidated Edison Co., 572 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1018 (1991).
336. Ayers v. Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557, 606, 525 A.2d 287, 312-13 (1987).
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the proofs demonstrate, through reliable expert testimony predicated
upon the significance and extent of exposure to chemicals, the toxicity
of the chemicals, the seriousness of the diseases for which individuals
are at risk, the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in
those exposed, and the value of early diagnosis, that such surveillance
to monitor the effect of exposure to toxic chemicals is reasonable and
necessary.
337
The court in Ayers imposed a court-supervised fund out of which claims
for medical surveillance were to be paid.3 The court found this method
preferable to a lump-sum verdict that would necessarily have to estimate
the total future amounts for surveillance.339
For medical surveillance claims of this sort to apply to toxic reproduc-
tive and genetic workplace injuries, public awareness of the problem
must be maximized to disprove the notion that these injuries are not
medical problems, but merely social problems. Thus, the "seriousness"
factors in Ayers should take account of the plaintiff's reasonable well-
being and should not be limited to traditional life-threatening conditions.
In any event, courts should take advantage of their equitable powers to
fashion an appropriate remedial scheme for medical monitoring.
2. Legislation to Enhance the Generation and Use of Information
Focusing on the remedial aspects of toxic reproductive and genetic
workplace injuries does not require tunnel vision. Accordingly, certain
recommendations are warranted to encourage information gathering,
particularly with respect to causation. This is the area in which legisla-
tion can be put to particularly good use. To reduce the overall costs of
these reproductive and genetic harms, information must be generated.
Workers with knowledge can make more informed choices regarding
when to conceive and bear children, whether to accept certain workplace
risks or seek a different job, and the extent to which medical attention
may be necessary. Employers, on the other hand, can make more in-
formed choices regarding the safety and health of their workers vis-a-vis
the costs of their products or services.
With the help of a special panel of experts in the field, Congress should
establish research priorities with respect to toxic reproductive and ge-
netic occupational hazards. This group of experts should establish the
scientific criteria to be used in these studies, with the aims of uniformity
and accuracy. 34° Research conducted by public bodies and private in-
337. Id. at 605-06, 525 A.2d at 312.
338. See also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396, 1399
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987) (establishing
distribution of settlement fund in mass litigation to compensate plaintiffs and their fami-
lies for injuries caused by exposure to "Agent Orange" during Vietnam War).
339. See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 609, 525 A.2d at 313.
340. A more detailed proposal, with a similar thrust, has been set forth in Lyndon,
Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws To Produce and Use
Data, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1795, 1835-41 (1989). This proposal includes a joint private and
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dustry would thus be coordinated for maximum utilization of resources
and nonduplicative endeavors. Ultimately, this proposal would enhance
the operation of the OSH Act by providing a consistent basis for imposi-
tion of OSHA standards with respect to various industries.
Cogent economic justifications exist for focusing increased regulatory
attention on the production and distribution of information regarding the
reproductive and genetic toxicity of workplace substances. Under the
current laissez-faire policy, however, industry has a variety of disincen-
tives to embark upon a course of information gathering. In particular,
because an enterprise may not recoup its full investment on research
viewed as benefiting the public good, the enterprise may not have suffi-
cient profit motive to warrant the research commitment.34 From an
economic standpoint, some employers may believe that ignorance is fi-
nancial bliss. The logical solution is to legislatively impose information
gathering requirements and to judicially encourage employer accounta-
bility for workplace injuries.
CONCLUSION
The legal system has demonstrated ambivalence toward extending
traditional rules of liability to cases of toxic exposure in the workplace.
Although the incidence of occupational disease has increased dramati-
cally in recent decades, most occupational disease cases encounter con-
siderable institutional resistance from both the workers' compensation
and tort systems. As a class, toxic reproductive and genetic workplace
injuries pose special problems for both systems. Technological uncer-
tainty, multiple causation, and latent disease processes, often present in a
single case, challenge the legal system in an unprecedented fashion.
Heretofore, toxic reproductive and genetic injuries have been un-
dercompensated, resulting in underdeterrence of employer conduct. The
workers' compensation system, having developed out of concern for trau-
matic workplace accidents, has retained the presumptions that non-
traumatic illness has its source in non-workplace factors and that injuries
not resulting in disability from work are noncompensable. Similarly, the
tort system has demonstrated confusion and ambivalence in addressing
toxic-exposure cases. Both systems have held on tenaciously, and per-
haps well beyond the point of logic, to traditional mechanisms of liability
public research program, based upon the concept of the Superfund and conducted ac-
cording to a specific plan and protocol. Costs would be borne initially by a general fund,
which would then be reimbursed by industries engaged in the use of substances revealed
as hazardous. See id. at 1837.
341. See id. at 1813. Professor Lyndon notes that the "benefits [of research] may not
be recovered by individual firms, or their impact may not be easily identifiable as the
results of one company's research. Thus, firms are unlikely to undertake costly testing,
because the benefits are public and cumulative and not reflected in the corporate balance
sheet." Id. In a positive sense, however, research can dispel some of the mystery of
toxicological harm through identification of toxic substances and processes, as well as
enhance the preventive medical care. See id.
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grounded in the cause-in-fact requirement. These archaic modes and
presumptions are inadequate to handle the increasing number of toxic-
exposure cases that will enter the system well into the next century. Now
is the time to shed the restraints of these presumptions and develop a new
jurisprudence to handle the great challenge posed by toxic injuries.
Reformers can undertake several initiatives at the present time to ease
these claims into both the tort and workers' compensation systems.
First, the cause-in-fact requirement should be relaxed by shifting to the
employer the burden of proving noncausation after an initial showing by
the claimant. This will reflect more accurately the respective abilities of
the parties to determine the role of workplace exposures in the injury.
Second, a legislative remedy establishing a fund for compensating de-
scendants of exposed workers must be enacted to eliminate judicial ad-
hoc line-drawing. Third, the tort system should be opened up to claims
of willful employer misconduct that falls short of an intentional tort:
This will assign appropriate liability for egregious fault-based conduct
and impose economic incentives on employers to undertake health and
safety measures in the workplace.
Furthermore, direct prophylactic measures should be implemented.
Medical monitoring claims should be allowed in tort actions brought by
workers against their employers and against third-party manufacturers.
Federal legislative efforts should include imposition of information-gath-
ering duties on employers and the establishment of research protocols
that will, eventually, provide the medical information to abate the
problems of causal indeterminacy.
Modification of the doctrines of tort and workers' compensation is de-
sirable to achieve equity within the legal system and to assign appropri-
ate economic burdens. This should be coupled with a comprehensive
effort to increase health and safety incentives in the occupational setting.
In the most concrete sense, the reproductive and genetic injuries in to-
day's workplace may be with us for generations to come. It is short-
sighted to demand that the modes and applications of the tort and com-
pensation doctrines remain intractable. The legal system must enter the
twenty-first century armed with the means to handle the harmful conse-
quences of technological progress.
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